General Qamar Javed Bajwa

A few months old, but worth a read.

From Dr Hamid Hussain

20 January 2022

“A friend is someone who tells you the truth; not someone who believes in you”. Late King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz.

I usually do review of army chief’s tenure. I do critical part when chief is in uniform and things done right when he hangs his boots. This is the first part. I know that this kind of work makes many officers uncomfortable but as they say ‘it is a dirty job; but somebody got to do it”.

غرور جاں کو مرے یار بیچ دیتے ہیں
قبا کی حرص میں دستار بیچ دیتے ہیں
یہ لوگ کیا ہیں کہ دو چار خواہشوں کے لیے
تمام عمر کا پندار بیچ دیتے ہیں

Regards,
Hamid

(TRANSLATION OF THE URDU COUPLETS: My friends sell their pride; To acquire a robe they sell their head covering. Who are these who for a few wishes; Sell an entire life’s treasure of self-respect)

General Qamar Javed Bajwa

General Qamar Javed Bajwa is in the last year of his extended six years tenure as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). Army is the most powerful institution of the country and COAS works behind the scenes and influence important policy decisions. This has been a preferred option for the institution to avoid controversy and even accepted by all major political forces of the country. This is a critical review of General Bajwa’s tenure in the context of his political role and running of the army.

General Bajwa was appointed COAS in November 2016 at a time of strained civil-military relations. General Bajwa inherited the institutional decision of political engineering project of actively supporting a third force under the leadership of Imran Khan. This project was later called a ‘hybrid regime’ as it involved active participation of the army in the political process rather than constitutional role of active support of a duly elected civilian government. This became a slippery slope and institution got entangled in political mud fights. There were two major reasons.

First, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan is a thin majority government supported by allies who were brought into the tent by the army by incentives or arm twisting. Second, Imran Khan was unable to switch from the role of an opposition leader to a head of the government. This had a negative impact on his relations with his allies as well as day to day governance. Army had to step in several times to tackle internal governance as well as some foreign policy issues. In this General Bajwa had full support of his senior brass. However, the negative fallout was that the institution became controversial for such an overt political role.
Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif in his speeches started to name senior army officers that was unprecedented and resulted in embarrassment. This combined with deficient performance of the government and serious economic crisis resulted in criticism of the army. This perception resulted in blaming of the army even in cases where government was using civilian levers to gag opposition and try to rig some by-elections. Army is overly concerned about its public image, and this made senior brass very uneasy.

In the summer of 2019, I became aware that General Bajwa was positioning himself for an extension. I am against extension of tenures of senior army officers as it seriously erodes professionalism of the army and creates friction among senior brass. My view is based on the sordid history of extension business in Pakistan army. In my view, three years tenure of Chief is a blessing and best instrument to safeguard institutional interest as new Chief can sweep the slate clean and start over again. Tinkering with it by extension has seen reputations ruined and institution badly bruised. At that time, I wrote following and shared with some officers:

“2019 looks more like 2007. General Pervez Mussharraf had come under criticism from different quarters of society and in the process army’s reputation was sullied. Change of command provided an exit. General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani slowly consolidated his command by sidelining old guard and then convincing all players that army has turned a page. The possible exit for the army is change of command in November 2019. However, personal interests of three key players; Prime Minister Imran Khan, army chief General Bajwa and Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (DGISI) Faiz Hamid now converge where extension of General Bajwa is being seriously considered. A three-year extension will serve all three parties. Bajwa to enjoy few more years of private jet and being the expert gamekeeper at the national park. Imran Khan will be seriously thinking about giving him an extension to make sure that an unknown factor does not come into equation. Imran is faced with enormous challenges. However, he has not been able to put his house in order. Rising economic woes and diverse opposition groups coming closer can cause many headaches. Having army brass in his corner is important to weather any storm. He would prefer to continue with known entity than venture into unchartered territory. In case of three years extension, Faiz will be among top contenders in 2022. After 18-24 months as DGISI, Bajwa can appoint him Corps Commander to make him eligible for the top slot. I am not in favor of any extension but especially in case of Bajwa, negative fallout for the army is manifold. Army is seen no more as a neutral body and extreme polarization of Pakistani polity is now directly affecting army as an institution.”

Imran Khan announced three years extension and General Bajwa lost all moral authority. In my interaction with dozens of officers of all ranks, I have not found even one who supports extension of tenure. Off course, they cannot express their views publicly. Ironically, General Bajwa was able to rally his institution when Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khosa entertained the petition that challenged General Bajwa’s extension (it was disposed of asking government to just legislate it). Now, even those who disagreed in principle, fully supported General Bajwa to make sure that no one can challenge army’s pre-eminence.

General Bajwa’s decisions about promotions and postings followed the normal process and he did not deviate from the norms. Two areas raised eyebrows in the army circles. One was picking some Major Generals from obscure and sidelined posts, promoting them to three-star rank and giving them prized postings. This was viewed as an attempt to give an impression of personal favor and hence adding ‘smiling nodders’ at ‘the long table of the knights.’ Second was promoting and giving prized postings to officers from his alma mater Baloch Regiment. The list includes four Lieutenant Generals; all with prized postings including three to be the top contenders to succeed him in 2022. There is also a lengthy list of Balochi Major Generals given prized command, staff and instructional appointments that improves their profile for further promotion. It is important to note that all these officers are qualified for promotions. However, competition is very tough from Brigadier and upwards ranks and posting; a sole prerogative of Chief can give edge to the officer.

In 2019, promotions of two officers; Faiz Hamid and Asif Ghafoor to lieutenant general rank created problems for the institution. During review process of promotions, I strongly advised against promotion of both officers. This was not about qualification of the officers but due to negative fallout for the institution. Faiz Hamid served as Director General of Counterintelligence (CI) directorate. Internal security wing of CI manages political tasks of the army. Spooks are successful only when they are not seen and heard. Hamid was extremely careless and against all norms, tried to do everything with his own hands. At that time, I wrote that “ Faiz Hamid has managed political tasks of the institution and his promotion may create potential problems if some damaging information becomes public while he is still serving at a senior position.”

I was referring to the information that at that time former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was accusing him of encouraging defection from Pakistan Muslim League ranks during 2018 elections but only privately to close associates and not publicly. In November 2017, a religious party blocked major highway to Islamabad for several days paralyzing the capital. Army negotiated a settlement between the government and protest leaders that was dubbed by many as abject surrender of government authority. The last sentence of the agreement clearly stated that this agreement was reached due to the efforts of army chief and his team. Faiz Hamid signed that document on behalf of the army. In early summer of 2021, I wrote about this phenomenon and its negative impact on the institution that “ I’m strongly against senior officers doing everything with their own hands. Many controversies could have been easily avoided if junior officers or in case of ISI retired contract officers were given such tasks (i.e., Faiz Hamid signing the TLP contract, DG Rangers handing money to protestors; a task which a Havildar could have easily done). In case of problem, retired/junior officer can be eased out with less negative fallout for the army. Chief is partly to blame for this mindset as he is meeting everyone and his cousin. He should have assigned such tasks to a junior officer to represent GHQ.”

About Ghafoor, I wrote “Asif Ghafoor has been the public face of the army and as Director General Inter Services Public Relations (DGISPR), he was conveying message of the army brass to the country. In this capacity, he became the public face of many controversies during civil military relations crisis of 2017-18. He was simply a messenger, but his elevation will be bad optics.”

My view was that as there are only about two dozen Lieutenant Generals therefore their promotion will create problems about accommodating them to low profile postings. I suggested that after supersession, both can be rewarded by giving them a lucrative post-retirement position in army-controlled corporations. When I became aware that General Bajwa has decided to promote both officers, I thought the middle ground to prevent negative fallout for the institution would be to give them second or third tier staff postings away from the limelight. Appointment of Hamid as Adjutant General (AG) and Ghafoor as Inspector General Communications & Information Technology (IG C & IT) looked like a safe bet. However, few months later when Hamid was appointed Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (DGISI), I concluded that General Bajwa has taken the institution into the mud puddle. In view of the role of DGCI in Pakistani context, elevation of DGCI as DGISI usually does not bode well for the concerned officer as well as the institution. Recent example of Lieutenant General Zaheer Ul Islam was the case in point.

Army suffered a serious setback when what is talked in hushed voices in drawing rooms is now discussed publicly. General Bajwa and Hamid’s name came up in opposition rallies, senior officers discussed in the mainstream media and ridiculed on social media. Army was blamed for the dismal performance of the government and army was forced to retrace its steps to go back to the drawing board.

Chief informed Imran that after three years of unqualified support, army will now take away the training wheels and move into its own lane. This was in early summer of 2021 when I became aware of it. I thought that this will lead to gradual divergence of path of Imran Khan and General Bajwa. I had been advocating that it was in institutional interest to step back and shared with many officers. One senior retired officer with fingers on the pulse of the events responded that “The reason that I think your advice to step back on matters like Justice Isa is not likely to be taken is because the institution, especially its head, has dug itself too deep in the hole. Probably a clash between IK and QJB (you have alluded to it) might cut the Gordian Knot.”

Later, army also sent reconciliation messages to two major opposition parties. These overtures rattled Imran Khan who saw this move as army brass undermining his rule. In the fall of 2021, friction between Imran Khan and General Bajwa on appointment of DGISI quickly turned into a rapidly widening gulf. I was completely baffled by this action of Imran Khan that made absolutely no sense. It was all downhill from that point. Now, army must keep a close eye on Imran Khan as he is mercurial and can throw a wrench in the machine causing new headaches.

General Bajwa periodically meets with a select group of journalists and social media activists. Most participants hold sympathetic view about the army that is fine. However, same group is also publicly denouncing opposition politicians and dissident judges and journalists. They may be expressing their personal views, but it is viewed as being done at the behest of the army and gives the impression of General Bajwa directing this crusade. These meetings are private and non-attributable. However, leaks start literally within minutes after the meeting as participants want to show off their connection with the fountain of power of Pakistan. When General Bajwa’s appointment was announced in the winter of 2016, he met few journalists and told them that he was looking forward to more interactions in the future. Some of us familiar with this terrain, cautioned against these interactions as such conversations quickly leak and make Chief controversial.

Full time involvement of COAS with political engineering meant that there was little time for other key areas. General Bajwa was unable to chart a new path in Baluchistan. Focus was only on throwing more bodies at the problem. Securing key centers and communications is an important task, but it needs to be complemented by engaging population and finding political solution including addressing forced disappearances and extra judicial killings. Alienation of Balochs is now almost complete affecting all segments of Baloch society.

More importantly, he mishandled the Pushtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) issue and in the process missing a chance of shaping post-conflict environment of the battle areas of former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). PTM is a grass root movement and by publicly and directly confronting it, army lost a large segment of tribal society that was its natural ally. Direct public confrontation emanating from General Bajwa and DGISPR was a case of poor judgement. This was despite the advice of caution by some senior retired Pushtun officers when General Bajwa invited them for a discussion on this subject. In my view absence of Pushtun officers at important higher command and intelligence posts contributed to mishandling of this issue.

A new element of management of higher judiciary called by some senior armed forces officers as ‘new frontier’ has dragged the army into new controversy and in the process earned the ire of some segments of the judiciary and a large segment of lawyer community. This was completely avoidable, but anger trumped the better sense. Justice Qazi Faiz Isa passed some remarks in his judgment against Faiz Hamid that had no practical implications. In few weeks, this would have faded away from the memory. However, army brass decided to retaliate against Justice Isa compounding the initial folly. The result of this futile exercise is that some justices are passing remarks in their judgements that embarrass defense establishment. This is more to show to the public that they are independent. The real threat is that Justice Isa may take his sweet revenge in time when he becomes Chief Justice in 2023. If Hamid is selected as army chief, then there is a clear and present danger of direct clash between army chief and Chief Justice.

I became aware of possibility of army’s potential clash with higher judiciary when after some negative remarks, there was talk of filing a reference to Supreme Judicial Council against Justice Gulzar Ahmad and Justice Isa. Sane voices at Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch warned against these moves. Unfortunately, anger of DGISI rather than a well thought out plan was the driving force. I strongly advocated against opening this front as this was unchartered waters. In fact, I argued that army will need the help of judiciary to solve the thorny issue of internment centers and forced disappearances. I recommended that now with a friendly government, a high-level coordination committee with members from government, army and judiciary should work for a framework of legislative and judicial measures to resolve the issue of people in military custody. General Bajwa asked Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khosa for help in this matter, but it was too late as army had already picked a fight with higher judiciary. Judiciary was divided by this time and Justice Khosa did not want to leave his office with allegation of working as handmaid of the army. He excused himself by stating that this will cause a constitutional crisis.

General Bajwa is in the lame duck last lap of his tenure and there is truly little that he can do that can shape the environment. He can do limited actions to provide room for his successor. As momentum is building up against Imran Khan to bring down his government, there is lot of uncertainty regarding his moves that can directly impact the army senior brass. Dangling the carrot of another extension to General Bajwa or early announcement of his successor to make Bajwa a lame duck chief are two possibilities. In view of deep mistrust and now clearly visible of anger of Imran against General Bajwa makes first possibility less likely. Early announcement of new Chief eight months before the retirement of General Bajwa will put a lot of strain on senior brass. The nuclear option is sacking of General Bajwa that will result in a crisis.

Earlier my view was that sometime in the summer, General Bajwa should move Hamid from Peshawar based XI Corps and park him in the sideline to complete his tenure. This will effectively take him out of the race as he will not meet the new criteria of command of a Corps for one calendar year. In view of rapidly changing scenario, it will be prudent to move Hamid sooner rather than later. Ghafoor can be kept at his current post to complete his tenure. Keeping Hamid at his current post and giving Ghafoor a high-profile command or staff appointment will add new uncertainties and complicate things for his successor.

In my view, policies adopted by the army as an institution in the last few years has unwittingly brought the institution into a dead-end street. The major risk is that in the dead-end street, one is an easy target for snipers. Army’s pre-eminence is accepted by everyone in the country, and it was able to achieve its objectives without taking direct control. It was ankle deep in politics and that was manageable as one only had to change the boots and keep uniform clean. Marching right into the mud of the political pig pen was not a smart move as mud has splashed all over the uniform. Now, uniform needs to be changed and washed. This will be the challenge for the next Chief.

Hamid Hussain
coeusconsultant@optonline.net
10 February 2022

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Imran Khan Phenomenon; My Prediction in 2011

I wrote this article back in 2011 for 3quarksdaily.com, someone in Outlook picked it up this year. I think I was not far wrong..

The 12th Man Rises

Pakistan’s greatest cricketing hero and second most successful philanthropist entered politics 15 years ago, promising a progressive, Islamic, modern, corruption-free Pakistan. His position as the most successful captain in Pakistan’s cricket history, the founder of Pakistan’s finest cancer hospital (providing free modern cancer care to thousands) provided him instant cachet, but for a long time he was unable to convert this personal popularity into votes in actual elections. With a political platform heavy on slogans (particularly against corruption) but short on specifics and without any obvious connection to already existing grass-roots politics, he remained little more than a fixture on the talk-show circuit for a very long time. Brief flirtation with Pervez Musharraf also set him back, as did a tendency to spout fables about Jirgas and hobnob with jihadi ideologues like Hamid Gul. But his biggest problem was his failure to create a team that could carry his party forward. The Pakistani Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was a one man show, with Imran Khan its only impressive asset. Even in parties dominated by one strong leader, there are other leaders in the wings and at least a semi-coherent ideology that delivers a section of the vote-bank on ideological grounds alone. Imran had no visible team and no clear ideology beyond a promise to “eradicate corruption”.

He did seem to genuinely believe in the formulaic slogans and historical framework of the 6^th grade“ideology of Pakistan” he learned in Aitcheson college. He seems to have some vague notion of “the two nation theory” (basically, “we are not Indians”) and an even vaguer “respect” for Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Allama Iqbal, twin icons of Pakistan’s history. But like his middle class fans, it is a superficial and shallow belief system, with little to show beyond a few empty slogans like “Pakistan first”, “Islamic welfare state” and “we are all Pakistanis now, so we are no longer Punjabis, Sindhis, Pakhtoons or Balochis”. Behind the automatic repetition of such slogans there does lurk an odour of “one folk, one party, one leader” fascism (as it does behind all crude nationalisms) but this is not to imply that Imran Khan is consciously thinking of leading a fascist takeover of Pakistan. His commitment to some notion of democracy seems genuine enough, though his priority (and this is not unusual among middle class nationalists) is nationalism, not democracy; in a crisis, he can easily convince himself that we may have to kill democracy to save the country. In any case, lacking organization and experience and without a good grasp of actual grass-roots politics, he was easily brushed aside by older established political parties.

Things changed in 2008. International pressure and a worsening domestic political position forced Pervez Musharraf to accept elections and eventually to bring “failed politicians” back in power. Imran Khan boycotted those elections, but came back on TV chat shows to dog the new (and admittedly, corrupt and incompetent) civilian set-up at every step. Meanwhile, GHQ managed to win back some of its tarnished reputation by staying away from public view, letting Zardari take all the blame for every disaster (even ones GHQ itself had birthed). The Zardari regime also managed to select an exceptionally bad team, from a clueless prime minister to one of the worst collections of cabinet ministers in Pakistan’s history. His opposite number in the PMLN did a marginally better job in the provincial government in Punjab, but not by much. Continuous infighting, breaking and remaking of coalitions, massive corruption at every level, and a terrorism problem that has kept the nation unsafe for international investment, all these drained the existing political parties of credibility and created an opening for an outsider.

Meanwhile, the deep state continued its “good jihadi, bad jihadi” policy at home and its double game with the US abroad. With the Osama Bin Laden assassination, matters seem to have come to a head with the US. The Americans want GHQ to arrange for an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan and appear willing to pay Pakistan for help in achieving this, but they are not yet ready to hand the place back to the Taliban and the Haqqanis and their Jihadi friends. GHQ meanwhile is playing hardball and smells victory (also smells disasters to come after victory, but victory has its own momentum) and maybe feeling tempted to get rid of the present civilian setup , preferring a civilian regime that is more closely aligned with their own strategic vision. The Facebook generation and the deep state may thus both be ready to opt for Imran Khan. And Imran Khan, it seems, is ready to opt for them. He has sharpened his anti-American message (a message that appeals to both the jihadi and the left-liberal wings of the middle classes) and toned down criticism of the army. He is saying all the right things about drone attacks, peace with our Taliban brothers and an American defeat in Afghanistan. He has been well coached by Shireen Mazari and Hamid Gul and his party is using trained cadres from the Islami Jamiat e Tulaba as well as enthusiastic youngsters from the Facebook generation. The moment has produced the man.

Having produced the man, the next step was to launch him on to the political stage in suitable manner. That step was achieved in Lahore on the 30^th of October. Whether the deep state helped out with the gathering or not, the crowd was impressive and enthusiastic. For most of the young people there, it was the first taste of a genuine mass event where everyone is pushing towards one goal with one voice. That this “goal” was being defined in the Paknationalist terms they have all been fed in school and in everyday propaganda was the icing on the cake. Grown men were seen to cry helplessly as carefully choreographed patriotic music blared and the crowd rose as one to sing the national anthem. Fed on a steady diet of news about corrupt, treacherous and unpatriotic politicians, the crowd was happy to anoint Imran Khan as the saviour who will eradicate corruption and save the nation. A generation that never saw the much bigger gatherings of Benazir Bhutto and her father seems to have been swept off their feet by the event. And why not? In addition to pushing the Paknationalist buttons, the rally had something for everyone. A prayer break (with the great leader praying alone on stage during the event) was followed by Shahzad Roy and guitar music. Bearded boys with Al-Jihad headbands mingled good naturedly with middle class families and liberal students from LUMS and NUST. For one shining evening, it must have seemed like hope has been reborn.

But it is still difficult to see how all this will translate into electoral victory unless the deep state plans to manipulate elections in a big way. Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy and established parties, even when discredited, have a grass-roots organizational advantage. In addition, Imran Khan’s personal popularity is wide, but not deep. Very different groups are currently united under his wing, but when push comes to shove, ideological and political choices will have to be made. Right now, Imran Khan has liberal followers who coexist in the party with hardcore Islamists who made their bones in the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba. But as he gets closer to real power, choices will have to be made. Since his own understanding of politics and the future of Pakistan is fundamentally aligned with the Paknationalists of the Shireen Mazari and Ahmed Qureshi variety, I predict his choices will turn to out to match those of GHQ to an extent that may surprise a lot of his liberal fans. This is a prediction, and I realize it is an unpopular one in the liberal blogosphere. Pakistani liberals are also hungry for a saviour and right now they prefer to latch on to whatever little bones Imran is throwing in their direction (guitar music right after Magrib prayers, women in visible positions, a modern look and feel) but I fear that Imran Khan is not just repeating his 6^th grade Islamiyat and Pakistan studies slogans because repeating simplified propaganda is part and parcel of modern mass politics. He is repeating them because he genuinely believes all those fables about rightly guided caliphs, Jirga justice, Islamic social welfare, the vision of Allama Iqbal, the “leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam” and so on. But since these stories are not too closely aligned with reality, historic or contemporary, a sincere believer is likely to become a pawn in the hands of those with a clearer vision of what they want and a more realistic view of politics and power. The Leninist term “useful idiot” comes to mind, but in this case it is not Pakistan’s 37 Leninists but its much more determined deep state is likely to take advantage of Khan sahib’s naiveté.

Of course, this may not be a done deal yet. Imran clearly has an idealistic bent and even GHQ may not find his crusading zeal easy to contain. And while everyone from Humayun Gohar to Ayaz Amir may be excited by this rally, reality has a way of setting in in Pakistan. The Paknationalist agenda is not new. Army men sitting in mess halls have been carping about unpatriotic politicians, bloody provincialists and separatists, uneducated Pakistani masses and massive foreign conspiracies for decades. But they have failed to wave a magic wand to fix these problems, not because they held back, but because no magic wand actually exists. Wanting to clean up Pakistan and run it like a tight ship (the current model is supposedly China, though a few inconvenient details come to mind: a 3000 year old civilization, a century of revolutions and wars, a genuine mass-based party and titanic achievements and failures, modern capitalism embraced like never before, and so much more) is all well and good, but you cannot create anything you want out of thin air; you have to work with what exists and the properties of what exists are not necessarily what the Paknationalists think they are. History and society may have features that make some choices possible and others nearly impossible. Paknationalism of the GHQ type does not have a sufficient overlap with history, political realities or the various cultures of Pakistan to allow the creation of the homogenous- Islamic-modern-military- mullah-netizen hybrid that is being desired. But it is possible that this vision has enough overlap with the common dreams of Pakistan’s middle class youth to let them have a go at it. One just hopes it evolves towards sanity and a softer nationalism instead of doubling down and going for broke by grasping “this sorry scheme of things entire; would we not shatter it to bits and then, remold it nearer to heart’s desire…”

Afghan National Army Lieutenant General Sami Sadat

Below is an opinion essay in the New York Times by Afghan National Army (ANA) Lieutenant General Sami Sadat. LTG Sami Sadat,only 36, is one of the most loved and respected men in all of Afghanistan. He demonstrated remarkable success as the commander of the 215th Maiwand ANA Corps before being recalled to Kabul. The ANA lost over 70,000 Killed in Action (KIA). Including the MoI (Ministry of Interior) ANP (Afghan National Police), NDS (National Directorate of Security) and Arbekai the total Killed in Action was probably well over 100,000. The exact number is not known since the Afghanistan MoI and MoD (Ministry of Defense) have both classified the numbers since 2010 because they were afraid it would harm morale. In 2020 alone ANDSF KIA was likely over 15,000. I have been told that many of the ghost soldiers in many ANA battalions were actually KIA being kept on the rolls so that their salaries could support their families.

Posting LTG Sami Sadat’s NYT essay for those who can’t read it through the pay wall:

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OPINION

GUEST ESSAY

I Commanded Afghan Troops This Year. We Were Betrayed.

Aug. 25, 2021

By Sami Sadat

General Sadat is a commander in the Afghan National Army.

For the past three and a half months, I fought day and night, nonstop, in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand Province against an escalating and bloody Taliban offensive. Coming under frequent attack, we held the Taliban back and inflicted heavy casualties. Then I was called to Kabul to command Afghanistan’s special forces. But the Taliban already were entering the city; it was too late.

I am exhausted. I am frustrated. And I am angry.

President Biden said last week that “American troops cannot and should not be fighting in a war and dying in a war that Afghan forces are not willing to fight for themselves.”

It’s true that the Afghan Army lost its will to fight. But that’s because of the growing sense of abandonment by our American partners and the disrespect and disloyalty reflected in Mr. Biden’s tone and words over the past few months. The Afghan Army is not without blame. It had its problems — cronyism, bureaucracy — but we ultimately stopped fighting because our partners already had.

It pains me to see Mr. Biden and Western officials are blaming the Afghan Army for collapsing without mentioning the underlying reasons that happened. Political divisions in Kabul and Washington strangled the army and limited our ability to do our jobs. Losing combat logistical support that the United States had provided for years crippled us, as did a lack of clear guidance from U.S. and Afghan leadership.

I am a three-star general in the Afghan Army. For 11 months, as commander of 215 Maiwand Corps, I led 15,000 men in combat operations against the Taliban in southwestern Afghanistan. I’ve lost hundreds of officers and soldiers. That’s why, as exhausted and frustrated as I am, I wanted to offer a practical perspective and defend the honor of the Afghan Army. I’m not here to absolve the Afghan Army of mistakes. But the fact is, many of us fought valiantly and honorably, only to be let down by American and Afghan leadership.

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Council in Support of the Resistance of Herat

Establishing “Council in Support of the Resistance of Herat”

Kabul-09 August 2021
As our beloved country burns in the flames of foreign invasion, and the ancient city of Herat has turned into a stronghold of honor and liberty, a number of Herat youths have come together in Kabul with much love for their homeland to form a support mechanism for a people’s resistance movement against foreign invasion in Herat. The name “Council in Support of the Resistance of Herat” has been agreed for this newly formed council.
The following were agreed in the session on August 9, 2021:
1) While appreciating and supporting the epic resistance by the People’s Resistance Movement of the Western Zone, and Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces, and also humble thanks to their efforts, sacrifices, and guiding the free and devout people of Afghanistan, especially the people of Herat;
2) Stressing on the important role and leadership of His Excellency Mohammad Ismaeel Khan at these crucial times for the future of the country and defending our land and honor;
3) Realizing the difficult times that the country is going through and stressing on collaboration, compassion, and companionship with the brave soldiers of our country, especially ANDSF, by the political parties and figures, social, political, media and religious institutions, women, businessmen, academics, doctors, and every individual citizen of the country;
4) Believing that the fate of Herat and the West Zone of the country is not separate from the rest of the country;
5) Calling on the central government to localize administrative and security institutions, and strengthen solidarity and coordination between the people’s resistance movement and ANDSF at national and provincial levels;
6) Emphasizing the core mandate of the Council for Integrating and Supporting People’s Resistance in Herat which includes strengthening solidarity, support, and coordination among influential figures and institutions in Kabul to assist people’s resistance movement and ANDSF in Herat and the West Zone;
7) Emphasizing on the responsibility of all citizens, and national, international, regional, provincial, and local institutions in further strengthening national unity and solidarity for defending national integrity of Afghanistan, as well as defending the lives, property, and honor of all citizens of Afghanistan, including Herat and the West Zone;
The Council in Support of the Resistance of Herat is established.

This council has a leadership board, and three functional committees (political, public relations, and fundraiser/financial support). Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta is elected as the president of the council unanimously.
More details about the council will be released soon. For more information, please contact Faridoon Azhand at:
WhatsApp: +93 (0) 797416062
Email: faridoonazhand@gmail.com
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Why Did the Indian and Pakistani Armies fail in 1965?

This is a chapter from Major Amin’s history of the Pakistani army. It is a very long post and there is a lot of repetition (do keep in mind that he wrote it mainly for a Pakistani audience, who may need convincing on some of the points) but I wanted to post it as a historical document and as something people who are interested in military history may want to read at leisure. As with any such analysis, there will be no many different opinions.. feel free to add yours in the comments.. Major Amin’s book has some excellent maps and tables that I was unable to transfer successfully. My apologies for that, but the points are pretty clear even without those.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN ANALYSIS – 1965 WAR by Major Agha Humayun Amin

Havelock said that ; “In philosophy, it is not the attainment of the goal that matters, it is the things that are met with by the way”. So it is with war. The most important thing for the student of military history or the art of war is not whether a country lost or won the war but how it was fought, how units performed in action, how decisions were made in face of the stress and strain of battle, the difference between practice and precept in short all matters pertaining to strategy tactics leadership equipment etc. In other words to simply analyze the war to answer the questions like “Whence”? “Whither” ? “Why”? and “How”?

In this analysis of war we have to go beyond probabilities and examine various facets of a particular situation and arrive at conclusions that will assist us in face of a similar crisis situation in future. War is the final audit of an army in which unit efficiency as well as higher and lower leadership is gauged and no book on an army is complete without analyzing in detail the qualitative efficiency of an army in actual War. Unfortunately most books written on both Pakistan and Indian Armies by foreigners and therefore meekly accepted by the subcontinentals who suffer from a subtle inferiority complex; as the final authority; do not discuss the qualitative efficiency of both the Pakistan and Indian Armies in any actual war; both as British Indian Army and as two different armies after 1947!

Instead these books beat round the bush discussing vague and largely irrelevant issues which their authors have decided to highlight, merely because they have decided to write a book and want to write their book without going into the subtleties of actual wars fought by the Indo Pak armies.

In the following paragraphs an attempt has been made to analyze the conduct of 1965 war and to answer certain questions about the qualitative efficiency of the Pakistan Army in a detached manner separating myth from reality and fact from fiction. This analysis is important because a considerable part of Pakistani military history has been deliberately or inadvertently distorted based on nationalistic parochial personal and inter arm prejudices and jealousies.

THE BRITISH COLONIAL LEGACY

We have already discussed in detail the impact of the British military tradition on the Indo Pak armies in our earlier chapters dealing with the armies of the English East India Company and the pre 1947 British Indian Army. This was not something confined to Indo- Pak subcontinent alone but an all Asia trend. From the late eighteenth century the “European Way of Warfare” was generally borrowed and follow as the gospel truth by many East European and Afro-Asian armies. The trend of “importing the European way of war” started around 1600 when the Ottoman Turks came into contact with the European powers in Eastern Europe and Russia.

Till 1500 the Europeans who had as a matter of fact military failed in the Crusades against Asia enjoyed no significant military advantage over Asia. Till the invention of gunpowder the cavalry remained the dominant arm in battle and the infantry was relegated to a secondary role. The ascendancy of European methods of warfare starts with the advent of Gustavus Adolphus(1496- 1560) of Sweden who introduced a renaissance in the art of warfare by “harnessing modern technology to a practical military philosophy” . (1)

Gustavus principal contribution was the introduction of a relatively superior conceptual framework of integrating military organization with weapons and tactics. He created an infantry organized in brigades of two to four regiments each of which had eight battalions of four companies etc. He introduced similar reforms in cavalry and artillery integrating artillery with infantry and cavalry in battle and restructured infantry formations in such a way that their firepower was enhanced. One of his most important reforms was employment of cavalry as a “shock weapon”.

Gustavus’s methods were copied by the French and the British. Gustavus ‘s tactics were improved by Turenne of France and Cromwell and Marlborough of England and were further improved by Napoleon who was able to benefit from the analytical studies of great military thinkers like Gribeauval Maurice de Saxe Bourcet Joseph Du Teil and Guibert. Formal military schools were organized in France where the art of war was studied while similar institutions were founded in Prussian and Sweden.

By 1600 Russia was the first country outside mainland Europe to realize that there was something conceptually and organizationally superior in the West European way of warfare which enabled them to defeat numerically superior but more primitively organized armies. lt may be noted that as late as 1592 the Russians were no match to the Muslim Tartars of the Golden Horde who sacked Moscow in 1571 and managed to penetrate into suburbs of Moscow as late as 1592. 1t may seem unbelievable to many but as late as 1660s the Crimean Muslim Tartars were one of Russia’s most feared enemies.(2)

A similar pattern of imitation was followed in the Ottoman Turk Army fromapproximately 1750 to 1914 when the Ottomans discovered that medieval tactics of cavalry assault were of little utility against relatively numerically superior or equal strength European armies with superior organization’.(3) Continue reading Why Did the Indian and Pakistani Armies fail in 1965?

The Qualitative Destruction of Pakistan Army between 1955 and 1971

From Major Amin. Originally written in 1999

Why Military Defeat in 1971-The Qualitative Destruction of Pakistan Army between 1955 and 1971 Major A.H Amin (Retired) https://www.militaryhistorycentre.com/blogs/news/pakistan-army-between-1965-and-1971
Why Military Defeat in 1971-The Qualitative Destruction of Pakistan Army between 1955 and 1971
• August 2020

Research teaching and writing were unproductive jobs in British India since they did not enable a man to be a deputy collector or barrister or doctor! It was a mad race made further mad by frequent outbursts of communal frenzy, which increased as population increased during the period 1890-1940. All this helped the Britishers who had been traumatically shaken by the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 when a largely Hindu majority army had rebelled under Muslim leaders! The British were thus happier playing the role of judges resolving Hindu Muslim disputes rather than performing the more unpleasant task of facing a combined political movement of all Indians regardless of race or religion as in 1857, 1919 or 1922! This is the basis of anti-intellectualism in the Indo-Pak Sub-continent. It is truer for Pakistan since the Muslims were educationally more backward and relatively less true, yet still true and applicable to India too! Pakistan and India have produced very few serious military writers. In Pakistan the situation is worse since an unofficial ban was imposed on military writing by various military usurpers who ruled the country for the greater part of its existence.

The finest summarizing of the incalculable qualitative harm inflicted on the Pakistan Army, by the self-promoted Field Marshal of peace, by a contemporary, was done by Major General Fazal I Muqeem, when he described the state of affairs of the Pakistan Army during the period 1958-71; in the following words: “We had been declining according to the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of regimes. Gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and administrators. Due to the absence of a properly constituted political government, the selection and promotion of officers to the higher rank depended on one man’s will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was sacrificed to the welfare of personalities. To take the example of the army, the higher command had been slowly weakened by retiring experienced officers at a disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar was the case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service. Some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an Armed Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage of senior officers particularly of the army denied the services, of the experience and training vital to their efficiency and welfare. Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for” 1.

Continue reading The Qualitative Destruction of Pakistan Army between 1955 and 1971

Book Review: The Quetta Experience: A Study of Attitudes and Values Within the Pakistan Army by David O Smith

From Dr Hamid Hussain

Book Review – The Quetta Experience: A Study of Attitudes and Values Within the Pakistan Army by David O Smith

Hamid Hussain

David Smith’s book The Quetta Experience is a groundbreaking and unique study of Pakistan army’s prestigious Command & Staff College that trains army officers for higher ranks. This book is based on interviews of American army officers who attended Command and Staff College at Quetta in Pakistan. Foreign Area Officers (FAO) of US army spent a year at Staff College.

Colonel David Smith is well qualified to embark on this kind of project. He attended Staff College Quetta in 1982 and has remained in contact with large number of senior officers of Pakistan army. In view of his extensive contacts in Pakistan army, he has been a Pakistan hand at Pentagon and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) for over two decades. Continue reading Book Review: The Quetta Experience: A Study of Attitudes and Values Within the Pakistan Army by David O Smith

Book Review: The Battle for Pakistan

From our regular contributor, Dr Hamid Hussain.

Book Review – The Battle for Pakistan by Shuja Nawaz

Hamid Hussain

Shuja Nawaz’s new book The Battle for Pakistan is a timely release of a work that reviews Pakistan’s security challenges and U.S. Pakistan relations. A new unpredictable era of U.S.-Pakistan relations is around the corner in view of recent U.S.-Taliban agreement and uncertain future of Afghanistan.

There are not many analysts and scholars of the region with access to both Pakistani and American sources. Shuja is uniquely equipped for such a project as he has access to Pakistani army high command as well as Pentagon and State Department sources. Book covers U.S.-Pakistan relations, working of Pakistan army high command and fraught civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Shuja gives a comprehensive view of expectations and disappointments of Pakistan and United States. The dilemma of this un-equal and transactional relationship is that each side fail to understand the interests of the other party and ends up blaming its own failures on the duplicity of the other party. This has been a predicted cycle over the last seventy years.

Shuja gives insight into power struggle among senior officers of Pakistan army. The first round was when General Pervez Musharraf was forced to give up his uniform and his confidant and successor General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani worked to bring his own team. He superseded and removed from important positions officers considered close to Musharraf. Kayani brought his own team of senior officers and then eased Musharraf’s ouster in 2008 to enjoy two three years tenures as the master game-keeper of the reserve.

Several segments of the book deal with civil-military relations. Shuja provides details of many episodes of serious friction. Army is the dominant force and civil-military relations are seriously imbalanced. Mutual distrust, antipathy and outright disdain for each other ensures repeated cycles of crisis. Each side has become expert in self-goal seriously damaging country’s reputation. Army high command has not been able to work with two major political parties; Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N). This forced them to put their chips on the third option. Current Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan is actively supported by army high command. Army high command and PTI repeatedly claim that they are on the ‘same page’, however, army is taking lead in tackling different problems faced by the country. Army nominated and supported serving and retired military personnel, bureaucrats and politicians have found place in all corridors of power. The seeds of distrust are thus sowed, and friction will inevitably increase between army and new political force of PTI.

Shuja also provides details about increasing role of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Pakistan’s internal affairs. In many cases, United States used Saudi Arabia and UAE to manage delicate domestic political matters of Pakistan. Pakistan is increasingly dependent on Saudi and UAE largesse due to difficult economic state. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) has developed close personal relation with President Donald Trump and Washington uses this connection to manage some areas of Pakistan policy.

Book is a must read for everyone interested in U.S.-Pakistan relations and the region. In Pakistan, the book launch became unintended casualty of controversy over Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s three years extension of service. Book’s South Asian edition was published in India in August 2019. When Pakistan enacted trade ban with India, book could not be delivered to Pakistan. A Pakistani publisher released the book and Shuja travelled to Pakistan for book launch ceremonies in several cities. Pakistan Supreme Court took the case of extension of COAS shaking the army brass. They asked Shuja to delay the book launch as it could generate criticism of the army although book presents Pakistan army point of view on various issues. Shuja refused to cancel book launch and army directly pressurized event organizers to cancel the events. More copies were sold in Pakistan due to silly acts of the brass.

Shuja Nawaz. The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighborhood (Karachi: Liberty Publishing), 2020

Hamid Hussain

May 2020

coeusconsultant@optonline.net

Why Musa was made C in C Pakistan Army

(via Major Amin)

Why Musa was made C-in-C

By Aslam Minhas

In October 1958, Ayub appointed General Mohammed Musa (who rose from the ranks) as the next C-in-C with Lt-Gen Muhammed Habibullah Khan as his Chief of Staff. In doing so, Ayub overlooked Lt-Gen Habibullah Khan, an officer technically and professionally more qualified than Gen Musa. It was an appointment that clearly sent a wave of resentment throughout the senior ranks in the GHQ.”I vividly remember my father who was a Lt-Col serving in GHQ at that time being acutely distressed at Ayub’s preference of Gen Musa over Ali’s (later Lt-Gen Ali Kuli Khan) father, Lt-Gen Habibullah Khan Khattak to command the Army. Till his death my father, who had a strong belief in merit over nepotism, maintained that was the precise moment from where necessity and nepotism started to matter far more than merit in the primary selections of the Armed Forces. Not to say that from time to time people with merit would not slip through.” (Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal Defence Journal, December 2001, p.7).

In words of late Aslam Khattak, elder brother of late Lt-Gen Habibullah and a respected name and a political heavyweight of Pakistan, Ayub rang up Lt-Gen Habibullah Khan (CoS) and said: “Biboo (General Habibullah’s nickname in the family), I am fed up with Musa (the then C-in-C) and want to get rid of the stupid chap. You please rush to Rawalpindi immediately to take over command. A formal notification will be delivered to you at the GHQ tomorrow morning.” The next day he did receive the letter but only to be told that he stood relieved with immediate effect. (Murtaza Malik The Curtain Rises: Uncovered Conspiracies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Royal Book Company, 2002, p.16).

After a few months, Gen Musa asked Ayub to relieve Habibullah from the army. One of the charges put up by Gen Musa against his CoS, Lt-Gen Habibullah, was that while in London on a trip, he had misbehaved with the maid of his host. Lt-Gen Altaf Qadir had the retirement order for Gen Habibullah with him. The order had to be served at the general’s home. He didn’t have the courage to deliver the letter. Gen Habibullah was capable of shooting the messenger. He asked Maj-Gen (later Lt-Gen) Abrar Hussein, the then military secretary to the GHQ to deliver the news. It would have been embarrassing for a junior officer to deliver the bad news to his senior. In spite of Maj-Gen Abrar’s protestations, he was forced to become the reluctant messenger. When Maj-Gen Abrar Hussein went to the residence of Lt-Gen Habibullah and handed the letter to him, the latter said: “So here it is.” It seemed Gen Habibullah knew what was coming. (Interview with Brig Noor Ahmed Hussein (younger brother of late Lt-Gen Abrar Hussein) on Aug5, 2002, in Rawalpindi). Gen Habibullah was then 46.

In a memo of the US State Department from the US Embassy, quotes its informant in Pakistan, saying that Musa (as C-in-C) neither controlled nor enjoyed any respect in the military (The American Papers 1965-1973 compiled by Roedad Khan OUP p. 120 Dispatch of 18 January, 1966, 12.05am). “Musa’s appointment to the top military job over the head of senior and perhaps better generals was Ayub’s idea of a strong army under a weak command ultimately responsible to him. He (Musa) was often scornfully (though uncharitably) referred to as the ‘mess waiter’.” (Brig A.R. Siddiqi The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality, Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, 1996, p. 55). “Musa ran the Army. The most important of Musa’s traits was one of loyalty — straight and simple. If Ayub had mentioned 10,000 yards of front, then the front had to be 10,000 yards, and so on. The framework of defence became more and more mathematical. The importance of imponderables of war was not catered for.” (M. Attiqur Rehman Back to the Pavilion, Ardeshir Cowasjee, Karachi, 1990 p. 133-134). Musa, though described as honourable and honest, “is hardly the stuff of which great generalship is made.” (Brian Cloughley A History of Pakistan Army, Wars and Insurrections, OUP, 2002, p.127).

MUSA’S VERSION: On Dec 30, 1985, when Ziaul Haq lifted martial law, General Musa was appointed Gov Balochistan. Brig Noor Ahmed Hussein (Golf buddy of Musa) visited Quetta during Musa’s governorship. Musa invited Brig Noor for a dinner. It turned out to be a dinner for two. On a full stomach, Brig Hussein asked Musa: “Sir, you were sixth in line. How did you become the C-in-C?”

Musa: “I will tell you the whole story and I have never told it to anyone before. I was a major posted at Quetta in August 1947 when I was transferred as Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General, (AA&QMG) Headquarters, 8th Division, Malir, Karachi. The train reached Rohri station at 2 O’ clock. Suddenly, I heard the Station Master shouting on the platform: ‘Maj Musa, telegram for you’. I waved at him from out of the window, and got hold of the telegram. According to the message, my previous Karachi assignment had been cancelled and I was promoted to the rank of Lt-Col and posted as General Staff Officer First Grade (G1) at Lahore 10 Division. I immediately shifted my baggage to the Lahore-bound train. I was to work under an English GOC, Gen Briggs, who said: “I know you lost your appointment at Karachi, but I am sure you will find this one as exciting.” Lo and behold, first day, the first pending file on my table, I open and the title reads: Court of enquiry in respect of temporary Brigadier, Substantive Colonel M. Ayub Khan, Punjab Regiment.

Musa chuckled: “The way I handled that file, the day I became the C-in-C.”

Brig Noor’s words were: “Ayub was accused of accepting cash and jewellery from fleeing Hindus during the days he was in the Boundary Force that lasted for five months in the later half of 1947. The charges were serious enough to warrant a court of enquiry against Ayub.” (Interview with Brig Noor Ahmed Hussein)

The “Same Page” saga..

Original article by Gen Asad Durrani. Comments in red by Dr Hamid Hussain. Additional comments in blue by Major Amin.

LG Asad Durrani views and my two cents in red.

Regards,

Hamid

The Same Page Saga

Lt Gen ® Asad Durrani

The Chief of Army Staff in Pakistan is not just another head of service, nor is he, strictly speaking, a “chief of staff”; the designation that the late Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto believed would deny the man on the horseback the clout to take over the Country. His assumption went ruefully wrong when Zia-ul-Haq, his handpicked COAS, not only putsched but also hanged him. In ‘Pakistan Adrift’, an account of my journey through the corridors of power, I have tried to assess the military’s role in the Country’s polity and an army chief’s special status in the power matrix – in which he often played the ultimate arbiter. For people like me therefore the commotion over the present incumbent’s service extension in the last week of November came as no surprise. The following chronicle however is not about any technicalities of the issue at hand, but about the algorithm of this game of thrones. Continue reading The “Same Page” saga..