Browncast: Hussein Ibish on the War in the Middle East

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In this episode I talk to Hussein Ibish, a resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Insititute in Washington DC and a longtime commentator on Palestinian affairs as well as the Arab world in general. He described how the crisis looks to a liberal Arab scholar who would prefer to see peace for both Palestinians and Israelis, and what we may expect in the future and ended with a rather pessimistic (or optimistic, depending on your point of view) vision of the near future. We hope to have him back soon to discuss what a saner outcome could look like and how that can be achieved (at least in theory; in practice we are probably in for prolonged violence). This is a complement to our earlier podcast with Dr Edward Luttwak, who presented a more optimistic vision of what Israel is trying to achieve and what it is likely to achieve.

Our friends at scribebuddy.com have prepared a transcript. I am posting it at the end below, unedited. But first, here is a chatgpt summary:

Blog Post: A Deep Dive into the Middle Eastern Crisis with Hossam Ibish on The Brown Pundits Browncast

In a recent episode of The Brown Pundits Browncast, Dr. Ali hosts Hossam Ibish, a prominent commentator on Middle Eastern affairs, to discuss the current tumultuous situation in the Middle East, focusing on the complex dynamics between Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Their conversation sheds light on a geopolitical crisis that has long roots in history and contemporary struggles for power, influence, and survival.

The Prelude to a Wider Conflict
Ibish sets the stage by explaining the origins of the current conflict, particularly after Hamas' attack on southern Israel on October 7. This event was intended to provoke a multi-front war, which Hamas hoped would involve Iran and its network of militias, notably Hezbollah, the Houthis, and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and Syria. However, despite these hopes, Hamas is not fully trusted by these groups due to its Sunni identity, which clashes with the Shia alignment of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.”

Hamas' attack, while significant, has not succeeded in igniting the widespread regional war it had hoped for. Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, notably went into hiding during the initial escalation, leaving Hamas without the robust military support it had counted on.

The Strategic Calculus: Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel
Ibish highlights how Hezbollah, despite its vast arsenal of missiles, has refrained from fully engaging Israel. The reason? Hezbollah's primary mission, as dictated by Iran, is not to fight for Hamas or Gaza, but to serve as a deterrent in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. This strategic restraint is informed by Hezbollah’s role as a vital asset in Iran’s regional power structure.

While Hezbollah attempted to support Hamas through limited military action on the border with Israel, the group has largely avoided provoking an all-out war. This approach preserves Hezbollah’s strength for its primary purpose—defending Iran—and avoids unnecessary depletion of resources in a battle it doesn’t see as its own. Israel, on the other hand, views Hezbollah’s arsenal and its proximity to its borders as a significant threat, which has led to the current Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Israel's Quest for a Recuperative Victory
Ibish introduces the idea of Israel’s need for a "recuperative victory." Following the security failures of October 7, Israel seeks to restore its national security image and the confidence of its citizens. For Israel, a clear-cut victory against Hezbollah in Lebanon would serve two purposes: weakening Iran's regional influence by crippling Hezbollah and restoring the sense of security for Israelis in the north.

However, Ibish warns that this may lead to only an "illusion of security." Even if Israel manages to weaken Hezbollah and push them back from the border, guerrilla warfare and insurgency tactics will likely persist. This scenario would mirror Israel’s ongoing insurgency struggles in Gaza, where an unending cycle of attacks and counterattacks creates a quagmire that may last decades.

Hezbollah’s Calculus: Back to Guerrilla Warfare?
One of the most compelling points in Ibish’s analysis is Hezbollah’s potential shift back to its guerrilla roots. The expansion of Hezbollah during the Syrian civil war, where it acted as the main ground force for Assad, has left the group vulnerable to Israeli intelligence and infiltration. A return to a more focused guerrilla war in southern Lebanon could help Hezbollah regain its earlier effectiveness as a lean, resilient fighting force, a possibility that Nasrallah seems to welcome.

Iran's Role and the Prospect of a Larger War
The conversation then shifts to Iran’s broader role in the conflict. Ibish points out that while Iran has supported Hezbollah and Hamas in the past, its current priority is regime survival and preventing any attack on its nuclear facilities. The Iranian leadership may be feeling domestic political pressure to act, especially as Israel has been striking at its proxies without significant retaliation from Tehran.

Ibish predicts that a "war of the cities," reminiscent of the Iran-Iraq War, could be on the horizon. Israel could target Iran’s oil production facilities and nuclear infrastructure, which would be a significant blow to Iran's economy and national security. In response, Iran might hunker down and focus on developing a nuclear weapon as a long-term survival strategy, similar to North Korea's approach.

The Grim Reality: Open-Ended Insurgencies
As the discussion wraps up, Ibish emphasizes the grim reality that Israel now faces: open-ended insurgencies in the south (Gaza), the north (Lebanon), and possibly soon in the east (West Bank). This strategy of counterinsurgency warfare offers no clear path to resolution, and Israel’s attempts to secure its borders may only deepen the quagmire.

Conclusion
In this insightful conversation, Hossam Ibish paints a complex and often bleak picture of the Middle East’s current situation. The region’s entrenched conflicts, ideological divides, and strategic imperatives have created a powder keg where no side seems capable of securing a decisive victory. Whether it’s Israel’s quest for security, Hezbollah’s guerrilla warfare tactics, or Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the road ahead is fraught with uncertainty. As the crisis continues to unfold, the stakes for all parties involved remain perilously high.

This episode of The Brown Pundits Browncast offers a sobering reminder of the intricate web of alliances and hostilities that define the modern Middle East, and the dangerous potential for further escalation in the coming months.

Continue reading Browncast: Hussein Ibish on the War in the Middle East

The Day After (the Gaza war).. From Dr Hamid Hussain

This piece is based on my presentation to a private group looking beyond the kinetic operations of current Middle East crisis.

The Day After

Hamid Hussain

“As a rule, there are no military solutions to political problems. Solutions are always combined. The use of military force is both part of policy and a pursuance of policy.”  

Major General Yoav Har-Evan; Head of Israel Defense Forces Operations Directorate

On 07 October 2023, Hamas launched a devastating attack on Israeli towns close to Gaza border killing over fourteen hundred Israeli soldiers and civilians including women and children.  Israelis were shocked at the stunning intelligence and military failure as well as the unprecedented carnage.  It was a forgone conclusion that Israel will react with the unprecedented vengeance. Hamas was surprised by poor response of Israeli security forces and went on a killing spree and even brought back over two hundred Israelis as hostages. This unexpected success may prove to be the end of Hamas as an organized political and military entity. Jury is still out on whether this incident will jump start a moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process or prove to be a fatal blow to two state solution.

Israel unleashed its fire power without any restraints and after two weeks of bombing, Gaza looks like a post-apocalyptic zombie land.  Of the nine thousand dead, half are children and that is a new blood-soaked record for the Middel East that is used to carnage. Israel started ground operation from the north while at the same time cutting off Gaza into half by surrounding Gaza City.  The first step is to gain control of the above ground battlefield and then think about what to do with the underground battlefield.  It looks that their goal is to finish Hamas fighters in northern half and blowing up underground tunnels before launching similar exercise in the south with the goal of completing high velocity kinetic operations in six to eight weeks. There is no intention of going in the tunnels to fight Hamas fighters as it entails high casualties. For Hamas fighters there are only two options.  One is to drop weapon and mingle in the civilian population and live to fight another day or fight to death with no quarter given or asked. Presence of Israeli hostages in the tunnels poses another challenge as using smoke, chemicals, or water to flood the tunnels means certain death of hostages along with Hamas fighters.

The free pass given to Israel by United States and European Union (EU) has an expiration date as large-scale civilian carnage cannot be ignored. Large scale protests in United States and European cities are putting pressure on the governments to allow humanitarian pauses if not a ceasefire.  This also unleashed anti-Jewish sentiments and violent acts against Jews all over the world. Modern conflict is not limited only to the battlefield but beamed in real time to the living rooms of a global audience and public opinion becomes an extension of the conflict. Israel cannot ignore public relations disaster despite a united nation at home and support from US and western governments.

Gaza is a densely populated area where 2.3 million Gazans live in a territory that is about thirty miles long and ten miles wide.  Out of 1.1 million Gazans living north of Gaza City, 800’000 have moved to south after incursion of Israeli troops.  Israel will allow several hours windows for civilian evacuation route along the main north-south Gaza highway from north to south and then reverse it when operations start in south. However, the small geographic size and very high population density puts limits to such exercise, and more than a half million Gazans will be in the middle of the inferno at any given time.  Israel will also allow intermittent humanitarian convoys into Gaza from Egypt and coordinate with Jordan for even airdrop of humanitarian supplies.  These measures are essential for public relations. Civilian casualties have probably peaked in the first phase, and it is estimated that it will be markedly reduced in the second phase. However, large scale damage is already done with a new generation of Palestinians filled with anger and hatred that will unleash the next round.

Kinetic operations are the easy part and will be completed in few weeks with less than few dozen dozen fatal Israeli casualties. In view of unprecedented carnage of Israel citizens, society is willing to absorb military casualties as high as about a thousand. War is a business of uncertainty and unexpected events not even initiated by the adversary can change the course. In 1997, midair collision of two Israeli transport helicopters killed 73 soldiers. This national trauma generated a groundswell of anti-war sentiment in Israeli society that resulted in Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Heavy work will be required when kinetic operations are completed as there is no clear path ahead. In view of un-precedented Israeli carnage, Israel entered the conflict without serious debate about exit strategy.  Kinetic operations had to be initiated quickly mainly to restore morale of Israeli public.  All other considerations took the back seat. Continue reading The Day After (the Gaza war).. From Dr Hamid Hussain

Iran and Hezbollah; Likely Options (from Dr Hamid Hussain)

a few days old, but looks like his assessment was correct:

09 November 2023

Previous piece about the day after of current crisis generated many questions and one question was asked about potential widening of theatre especially Iran/Hezbollah role.

My response below;

I short and medium term, Hezbollah, Iran, Israel & USA have no interest in expanding the conflict. Operationally, Israel can not conduct a northern front large scale operation at this stage. Major factor is that Israel has used large stocks of Tamir missiles of Iron Dome interceptors and major threat from Hezbollah is its expanded rockets arsenal. To give an example of cost ratio, average cost of long-range rocket used by Hamas and Hezbollah is $300-400 while each Tamir interceptor missile of Iron Dome costs $40’000. Of 500’000 mobilized troops, 60% on Southern front in Gaza and 40% in West Bank and Israeli cities with large Arab population to keep lid on restive Palestinians. Expanded northern front will require mobilization of additional reserves putting more strain on already stretched economy. In addition, over 200’000 Israelis are displaced from southern and northern border areas. All this points to Israel’s preference to focus on south and keep all other fronts quiet. This does not mean that Israel’s hands are completely tied. Hamas rocket threats are markedly reduced by ground operation in Gaza, ten Israeli Iron Dome batteries with two batteries from US currently in transit although whole inventory of Tamir interceptor missiles in US inventory have reached Israel that can tackle Hezbollah rocket threat although interception rate may not be over 98% in view of heavy barrage. (US army has no role for Iron Dome as it cannot be integrated into American anti-missile system. They never requested it but Congress as a favor to Israel approved $373 and told Pentagon to buy it. Pentagon complied but parked it at Joint Air Force Base in Washington as it had no use of the system ). Air Force though not a perfect instrument to tackle rocket threat can be used to keep heads of Hezbollah down in Lebanon. In my view, northern front will remain quiet unless a major unintentional mishap occurs on either side.

US armada is a signal only for Iran/Hezbollah (you don’t need a nuclear submarine and aircraft carrier for action against Hamas fighters in a tunnel) and Hezbollah and Iran have no wish to commit suicide. Small rockets from Lebanon to keep area warm but no action to start a fire. Iran is very happy with this situation and ayatollahs are savoring the return on their investment.

US and Iran in back room negotiations to keep things limited to Hamas. Iran promising to keep Hezbollah and other proxies in Iraq and Yemen on a tight leash and promise of getting some hostages especially with US and European passports get released in return for US not doing anything about the $ 6 billion in escrow account in Qatar that was put there recently after last round of prisoner swap deal between Tehran and Washington.

I’m working on a piece about role of regional players. It is all Byzantine deals and nothing about peace or morality. I’m aware of UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan quietly supporting the effort to completely demolish the spoiler Hamas this time ( they expected the same in 2006 that Israel will demolish Hezbollah). Their only condition is to keep casualties low and allow pauses for humanitarian efforts (Jordan airdrop, UAE planning a field hospital in Gaza) so that their angry streets don’t cause domestic problems.

Iran’s general strategy is to keep small fires in the ring around Israel so that it cannot concentrate efforts to directly threaten Iran especially attack on nuclear facilities.  Hamas is one piece of the puzzle and other two are Hezbollah and some activity on Syrian front where Israeli air force busy in interdicting weapon shipments and attack storage facilities in Syria.

Tehran was already diversifying the portfolio by increasing support to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza and some towns of West Bank (PIJ head Ziad Nakhle is parked in Damascus). Hamas has served their purpose to keep Israel busy enough so that they do not fully concentrate on a major action against Tehran. October 7 crossed a certain threshold as far as Israel is concerned. In long term, it depends how Israeli strategic community comes out of this crisis. It is a game changer and much bigger than Yom Kippur trauma of 1973. In October 1973, Israeli strategic calculation changed to making peace with Egypt. October 2023 may do the same to make peace with Palestinians but I don’t have hope for that outcome. More likely strategic decision will be that Iran is the root cause of Israel pain and historian may record this conflict as first Israeli-Iranian war. The project will be to bring down the very regime of ayatollahs and Iranian response will be to shift to West Bank and possibly Arab citizens of Israel to start the fire in Israel’s backyard that is ripe for such efforts. Israel’s efforts will mirror image that of Iran and concentrated in Iraqi Kurdistan and Azerbaijan that already serve as major bases for Israeli operations against Iran.

“History tells us that it gets worse before it gets better”.        Iraqi Shia seminary student

Regards,

Hamid

The Parsis of Bombay

I just finished reading Michael Axworthy’s Iran: Empire of the Mind, one of Razib Khan’s recommended reads on Iran. The book serves as a useful primer on Iranian history for novices (such as myself), covering over 3,000 years of history in less than 300 pages. It lacks the literary flair and flourish of Tim Mackintosh-Smith’s magisterial Arabs. I found myself skimming through the latter parts of the book- the Pahlavi era and the subsequent Islamic Revolution- as I am broadly familiar with the events of the modern period.

 Pre-Islamic Persia was an advanced and sophisticated civilisation. Axworthy provides a good overview of the Achaemenid, Parthian and Sassanid periods of Iranian history. Ancient Iranians developed a complex and nuanced theology centred around the teachings of the prophet Zoroaster. Zoroastrianism was the predominant religion of the Sassanid Empire, one of the superpowers of the pre-Islamic world. All of this was to change with the arrival of Islam in the seventh century. The armies of Islam burst out of the Arabian Peninsula like a supernova and reduced the Sassanid Empire to dust. The Zoroastrian religion was swept away in this upheaval.

 One group of Zoroastrians escaped and sought refuge in Gujarat in Western India. These Zoroastrians are commonly known as the Parsis (from Pars or Persia). The essay below is a personal account of the Parsis of Mumbai. I had written it a decade ago. Reading Axworthy’s book brought some of those sweet memories back.  

Continue reading The Parsis of Bombay

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