Vimal Yoganathan, South Asian Representation, and Football’s Unspoken Racial Hierarchies
Vimal Yoganathan’s debut for Barnsley, highlighted by his two-goal performance, represents more than just a personal victory. His success shines a light on the severe underrepresentation of *South Asians* in English football, where they make up 7% of the UK population but only 0.3% of professional footballers.
There are two important nuances to consider regarding the South Asian population in football. Firstly, a significant portion of this population consists of adult immigrants, who typically do not enter professional sports due to their age upon arrival. Secondly, there has been some positive progress, with a 29% growth in the number of South Asian players in recent years, although this remains a small fraction relative to their overall representation in the UK.
For South Asian players, Yoganathan’s story is an outlier, illustrating the deeply embedded systemic and cultural barriers that continue to block progress in a sport dominated by white coaches and management.
Even with a close examination of Vimal’s story, there are notable parallels to a more subtle and complex issue unfolding in the Premier League, involving themes of racism, nationalism, and financial power. While these connections are striking, I prefer not to delve into speculative discussions on public platforms.
Finally, there is a fourth garden, the Garden of the One. A seeker went to that door and a voice asked, “Who is there?” The seeker answered, “I am here, Beloved.” The voice replied, “Then go away.” The seeker went away, and continued his search and meditation for many years, until finally he returned and once again the voice met him with the same question as before. This time, the seeker answered, “You are here.” Then the seeker entered and there was no seeker and no sought, there was no lover or beloved, there was only the “One” forever and ever.
as an aside I found it rather bemusing to see the “Ghorbeh” (the Cat, which is a shorthand for the map of Iran) displayed on the screen
One of the commentators on this blog responded to my commentadvocating for 55% female representation and leadership on the Waqf board controversy with the following:
“When you want to destroy a company from the top, you put women in the C-suite. The same logic applies here, it’s a sinister ploy.”
Presumably (and hopefully), this is simply bad banter—my British sensibilities are primed towards the funny kind. However, given the complex issues around patriarchy in Pakistan, as Omar’s recent post on blasphemy suggests, it’s important to examine this claim and set the record straight.
Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Legacy of Tragedy and Controversy
Rather than engaging in such cynical takes on women in leadership, let’s look at the tangible results produced by women who have ascended to leadership positions—specifically the career of Indra Nooyi, the former Indian (Tam-Bram from Chennai) CEO of PepsiCo, and how her achievements compare to those of her competitors.
Indra Nooyi | IIM Calcutta
Revenue Growth: Under Nooyi’s leadership, PepsiCo’s revenue grew by 80%, while Coca-Cola’s revenue fell by approximately 9% during the same period.
Stock Performance: PepsiCo’s stock price surged by 109% under Nooyi, far outpacing Coca-Cola’s 67% growth from 2006 to 2018.
Healthier Product Shift: Nooyi spearheaded PepsiCo’s pivot from sugary snacks to healthier options, increasing its “guilt-free” product revenue to 45%. Meanwhile, Coca-Cola struggled to make comparable gains in the health-conscious market.
This was on old post about blasphemy laws that I wrote in 2015 and revised in 2021. It is on the site, but hard to search for, so i decided to repost it now that blasphemy is again in the news with two recent episodes where the police were able to arrest the accused (ie save him from mob killing) but then the police themselves executed the blasphemer in custody. There has been an episode in the past where a Shia who had blasphemed against the sahaba (the companions of the prophet) was killed (with an axe) by a police officer while in custody and there have been a couple of episodes where blasphemers were killed by other prisoners, but this trend of execution by the police is now at a new level. The police officers who carried out the execution were garlanded and immediately received promises of millions of rupees in rewards (though with Pakistan reaching new levels of conmanship, it is likely that some of these pledges are fake). So now, not only will the mob kill you any time you are accused of blasphemy, if the mob fails, the police will finish the job the same day.
Of course, if it does reach trial, the courts will always sentence to death in any case because judges who let off previous accused have also been killed.
SO it goes.
Meanwhile, as liberal muslims and Liberals and Leftists in the West who want to use orthodox Muslims for their own purposes and want to find ways to oppose blasphemy laws without upsetting Muslims will dig up their usual “colonial era blasphemy laws in Pakistan” story to see if blame can be pinned on some dead entity, such as the British empire. So I wanted to have a post handy where I could direct them; so here it is, a quick overview of the blasphemy issue in Pakistan
A blasphemy law was part of the 19th century Indian Penal code as section 295.. It was not a bad law at all and the lazy habit of blaming it for later blasphemy law crap in the Indian subcontinent is just that: a lazy habit.
Here is section 295 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860:
Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.—Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
The aim of the law was to prevent/punish things like someone throwing a dead pig into a mosque or a cow’s head into a temple. An actual physical desecration is to be punished. This seems like an eminently sensible law and cannot really be blamed for all the evils that came later. But in the 1920s there was a famous case in Lahore where a Hindu publisher was arrested by the colonial authorities after Muslims agitated against him for having published a book called Rangila Rasul (“merry prophet”). The British colonial authorities tried to prosecute him for hurting the religious sentiments of Muslims, but the high court in Lahore (quite properly) found him innocent because there was no law on the books against just publishing a book, no matter how offensive it may be to some religious group. Fearing future communal discord from such provocations, the British then had the legislative assembly add section 295A to the law in order to criminalize deliberate attempts to “outrage the religious feelings of any community”. This section states:
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 4[three years], or with fine, or with both. But even with this new and expanded article 295A in place, prosecutions for blasphemy were few and far between until, in the 1980s, General Zia added two new sections to the law in Pakistan and really set the ball rolling. These infamous sections are labelled 295B and 295C.
295-B: Defiling the copy of Holy Qur’an. Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract there from or uses it in any derogatory manner for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life. 295-C: use of derogatory remarks etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet: – who ever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation innuendo, or insinuation, directly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable for fine.
Note that the law no longer requires that the offense be malicious in intent. Intent is no longer an issue. Insulting the Quran or the prophet, even unintentionally, is now punishable by death. To seal the deal, in 1991 the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan struck down the option of life imprisonment and made the death penalty obligatory. And of course, the new amendments only apply to blasphemy against Islam, not against all religions (in this sense, the new laws are more “rational” and internally coherent, since all religions blaspheme against all other religions as a matter of course, so the original law was not coherent in principle, though still workable in practice). Between 1984 to 2004, 5,000 cases of blasphemy were registered in Pakistan and 964 people were charged and accused of blasphemy; 479 Muslims, 340 Ahmadis, 119 Christians, 14 Hindus and 10 others. Thirty-two people charged with blasphemy were killed extra-judicially during that time. More have died since. Eighty-six percent of all the cases were reported in Punjab.
Every time the shit hits the fan, many liberal people start hoping that this blasphemy law can be changed to finally stop or slow down this torrent of prosecutions and killings. Others have noted that the law is not the problem, free-lance enforcement of a broader blasphemy meme in the Muslim community is the problem and will likely persist even if the law is repealed.
In my view the law is not the only problem, but it IS a very potent symbol of the surrender of state and society in front of the blasphemy meme. Repeal of the law will not kill that meme, but repeal of the law will be an equally powerful signal that things have changed and that state and society no longer approve of the killing of blasphemers. It will not end the problem, but it will be the beginning of the end. Repeal of the law is not a sufficient condition for this nightmare to end, but it is a very important necessary condition.
Waqf properties, governed under Islamic law, make up the third-largest landholdings in India. Spanning nearly 900k properties & 2.3mn acres—roughly the size of Delaware or Luxembourg—they include iconic sites like the Taj Mahal, Jama Masjid, and Charminar. Despite their cultural significance and prime urban locations, these properties have faced scrutiny for mismanagement, with their total value estimated at ₹1.2 lakh crore ($14.5 billion).
Taj Mahal
Waqf refers to properties dedicated to religious or charitable purposes under Islamic law. Once designated as waqf, ownership is transferred irrevocably to Allah. There are 32 waqf boards in India, including two Shia boards, with about 200 individuals managing them. Once a property is declared waqf, it remains so indefinitely, leading to disputes such as claims on islands in Bet Dwarka, the Bengaluru Eidgah ground, and Kolkata’s Tollygunge Club. Some of these properties, like the Royal Calcutta Golf Club and ITC Windsor Hotel, have historical significance dating back to the Mughal era.
Jama Masjid
The Waqf (Amendment) Bill 2024
The Waqf (Amendment) Bill 2024, currently under review, proposes around 40 amendments to the existing Waqf Act of 1995. It seeks to overhaul how these properties are governed, introducing non-Muslims and Muslim women into Waqf board governance, updating the registration process, and shifting property dispute resolutions from Waqf tribunals to civil courts. The aim is to improve transparency and accountability across the nearly 1 million properties controlled by 32 Waqf boards.
Charminar
Historical Context
Waqf properties trace back to the Delhi Sultanate and were formally regulated during the British era under the Mussalman Waqf Act of 1923. This act aimed to curb the misuse of Waqf properties, but even today, mismanagement, corruption, and encroachments plague these lands, prompting calls for reform. The 1995 Waqf Act, later amended in 2013, did little to prevent the ongoing inefficiencies, leading to the introduction of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill 2024.
“Repeated gut detoxes and probiotics won’t help if you continue holding onto the “tiger’s tail”—the stress. That’s the missing link in your detox protocol” Dr. Ashmita
With 100 days left until I turn 40, I’ve become laser-focused on preemptive care—a philosophy inspired by Bryan Johnson’s Blueprint. My genetic predispositions, including non-alcoholic cirrhosis and cardiac arrest, means that health is more than just important—it’s personal & spiritual*.
In the 15th century, Venetian explorer Niccolò de’ Conti coined the phrase “The Italian of the East” for Telugu, captivated by its melody and rhythm. He famously asked, “Is this language or music?”
Telugu boasts around 96 million speakers and ranks 16th globally, while Italian, with approximately 60-70 million speakers, falls outside the top 20, usually around 21st or 22nd.
Despite its cultural prominence, Italian’s global reach may be possibly smaller than Telugu’s owing to this upcoming election between the beautiful & elegant Dravidians of the United States.
Telugu Usha Vancereprising the historic Telugu-Tamil rivalry; Veep Kamala Harris
Maybe in light of the emerging 21st century power dynamics, it’s more appropriate to consider Italian as the “Telugu of the Mediterranean?” 🙂
But less on geopolitics and back to linguists; much like Italian, Telugu’s frequent use of vowel-ending words creates a natural rhythm, blurring the lines between speech and melody. Many thanks to the excellent video below for so much of the source content of the post.
Tl;dr Four Reasons Why Telugu is So Poetic:
Vowel-Endings: Nearly every word in Telugu ends with a vowel, making it rhythmically pleasing and easy to rhyme.
Vowel Harmony: Telugu’s phonetic structure ensures that vowels are adjusted for a more aesthetically pleasing flow, creating a melodic cadence.
Verb Flexibility: Telugu verbs can take on thousands of forms from a single root (e.g., choodu becomes choosaanu, choosthunnanu, choosindi), allowing for nuanced expression and sound variation.
Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Dravidian Influence: The layering of these linguistic traditions adds depth and variety to Telugu, enriching its poetic and musical capabilities.
India’s influence on world history is undeniable, yet the narratives that emerge often come from unexpected directions. William Dalrymple’s latest, The Golden Road, shines a light on the central role India played in ancient global exchanges—spreading ideas, art, religion, and science across vast geographies. From the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, the legacy of Indian civilization is visible everywhere.
Consider Mamallapuram (Mahabalipuram), a bustling port city under the Pallava dynasty (275-897 AD), whose ships once connected India to Southeast Asia. These traders didn’t just carry textiles and spices; they brought with them Sanskrit, Buddhism, and Indian architecture. The awe-inspiring Angkor Wat in Cambodia, the largest religious monument in the world, and Borobudur in Java, the largest Buddhist temple on the planet, are prime examples of how Indian ideas were adopted and adapted by local cultures. In Angkor Wat, Hinduism’s cosmology of Mount Meru shaped the temple’s design, while Borobudur’s mandala-like structure reflects Indian Mahayana Buddhism’s spiritual journey to enlightenment. Continue reading The Power of the ancient Indian Story
To Raise a Fallen People is an interesting collection of Indian writings from the late 19th century, compiled by Professor Rahul Sagar, who is Associate Professor at Yale-NUS College and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
Professor Sagar has gathered together several Indian writings on national and international affairs from the late 19th century and he has chosen to frame the book as “Indians were not morons and had thoughts about the rest of the world in the 19th century that can tell us about Indian foreign policy today”, but this editorial frame adds nothing to the book. The book is good because the selections are interesting and worth reading, not because it sheds any light on current Indian foreign policy.
One sees what various Indian thinkers thought about their own position in the world in the late 19th century, when the mutiny had been crushed and British rule in India had stabilized and seemed almost permanent. The writers range from famous authors and politicians such as Bankim Chatterjee, Mohandas Gandhi, Annie Besant and Salar Jung, but the one i found most interesting was a letter from Anandibai Joshi (first Indian woman to go to the USA for medical studies) explaining her decision to go to America. The “prohibition” against foreign travel is discussed (and vehemently rejected). The wonders of Great Britain are described, but so are her crimes. There are interesting pieces from some Muslim thinkers, all of whom regard the Hindu majority as basically irrelevant and are focused on the “clash” they think is going on between islamdom and Western powers (with complaints against Russians as oppressors of Ottoman Turkey and invaders of central Asia, but also against the British for raking up Armenian massacres; Muslim writers feel the British empire is also a Muslim empire (since more Muslims were subjects of Victoria than of any Muslim sovereign) and wish Britain would heed their concerns about the caliphate, etc). In short, a great window into late 19th century colonial India and its intellectuals. Ignore the foreign policy hook that the author has used to set up the book and just enjoy the excerpts.
Across India, discussions about demographics are charged with questions of destiny and identity. In the Hindi belt, particularly in UP and Bihar, the focus often turns to birth rates between Hindus and Muslims, a dynamic sometimes referred to as a “cradle race.” This term reflects deeper concerns about societal balance, yet paradoxically, it also influences high birth rates among upper castes. I know a (Hindu) woman from Bihar who recently had her third son, a personal example of how this dialectic pervades everyday life.
Globally, the Hindu population has grown modestly from 11% to 15% over the past five centuries. In contrast, the share of the Abrahamic faiths has surged from 37% to 54%, moving from a plurality to a Scottish majority.
In the same period, within what is the modern boundaries of India, the Hindu population has seen a subtle decline—from 85% to 79%—reflecting a complex history of migration, cultural shifts, and geopolitical changes. The most pronounced demographic shifts occurred in areas now known as Pakistan and Bangladesh, which made the Hindu population of the Greater Indian Subcontinent dropped from 78% to 66%. Despite this decline, these two countries still rank as the 2nd and 5th largest Hindu populations globally, underscoring their profound & immovable Indic substrate.
Imperialism in India over a long millennia
Mughal imperialism significantly reshaped Bengal’s religious landscape with taxation settlements, British colonialism introduced Christianity with further irrigation works also impacting demographics in Western Punjab, and Partition irrevocably redrawing demographic lines.
The narrative of global demographic displacement—often framed as the decline of a lighter-skinned, prosperous population in a democracy—oversimplifies and distorts the real dynamics. The Parsis of Mumbai, for example, despite their dwindling numbers, continue to wield significant economic and cultural influence. Their enduring presence in South Bombay, marked by landmarks and institutions, underscores a critical point: demographic numbers don’t necessarily dictate power or presence.
Dishoom is a homage to the Bombay-Irani cafe culture; one of London’s most prominent restaurant groups
Historically, the emergence of elites often resulted from historical accidents rather than pure meritocracy. The upper castes in India, consistently representing 15-25% of the Hindu population over centuries, exemplify this. Their enduring influence, despite societal changes and efforts toward social equity, highlights the deep-rooted structures that shape contemporary realities.
the new French cabinet
In France, the overrepresentation of white individuals in parliament—estimated at 90-95% despite whites comprising 70-85% of the population (but these numbers are notoriously hard to get by as France doesn’t do official racial & ethnic counts so as to not undermine the indivisibility of the French people & nation)—reflects a global issue: power doesn’t always proportionally reflect demographic makeup. This discrepancy invites a broader reflection on how historical advantages and institutional control determine who holds power.
This discussion is crucial, not just academically, but for understanding how identity, power, and demographics intersect in complex ways. By critically examining these narratives, we can better understand the realities of demographic changes without succumbing to deterministic thinking.
The myth of democratic liberal capitalism is the presumption that voters determine the true shift of power. The growing inertia of the deep state—civil services and military administrations—makes genuine reform difficult, echoing George Orwell’s observation: “but England will still be England, an everlasting animal stretching into the future and the past, and, like all living things, having the power to change out of recognition and yet remain the same.”
It’s nigh on impossible to imagine India that is not Bharat, to envision a future where Hinduism isn’t deeply & inextricably intertwined with its land of origin. It is much more likely that one day, Vedic traditions will once again flow across the banks of the Indus, reclaiming the lost civilization of the past.
