Major Amin sent over an extract from his writings about the 1947 attempt to grab Kashmir using tribal lashkars and why it failed. Obviously from a Pakistani POV, but an objective one.. There are formatting issues that I found hard to fix, but you will get the gist.
Liaquat Ali Khan and Malik Ghulam Mohammad’s Kakkezi relative Railway battalion major Khursheed Anwar was the biggest reason for the tribal invasion’s failure on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis.
As per Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was closely connected with leading the invasion , the tribal invasion was planned in September 1947 but Khursheed Anwar disappeared to get married to a Muslim League worker.[1]
Pakistani state had two excellent choices , as military commanders to lead the main tribal attack on Muzarrafarabad-Srinagar axis . These were Major Taj Khanzada DSO,MC and Gen Zaman Kiani, sword of honour of IMA and ex chief of Indian national army.
Such was the criminal parochialism in the newly created Pakistani state that a railway battalion emergency commission was handpicked by PM Liaquat and his finance minister Malik Ghulam Mohammad,on grounds that he was Ghulam Mohammads Kakkezai clanmate and relative from Jullundhur.[2]
It was most irrational to pick up a man whose only qualification was petty intrigue and fomenting riots and who had no military knowledge.
But that is how the All India Muslim League was run , right from its creation in 1906.
Khursheed Anwar further committed a major security breach when against orders given to him , he contacted Brigadier Iftikhar Khan (Minhas)-later chief designate, at that time commanding 103 Brigade (old Nowshera Brigade) , [3] and requested him for machine guns.
As per Shaukat Hayats memoirs , Iftikhar reported this matter to the Pakistan Army C in C ( Gracey at that time officiating as acting C in C), who in turn reported the matter to Indian Army’s British chief ,Lockhart , thus first major intelligence breach occurred.[4]
As per Dasgupta :–
“ The Defence Committee met at 10 a.m. on 25 October, under Mountbatten’s chairmanship. General Lockhart informed the members that he had received a telegram on the previous day from the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Gracey. This conveyed that a force of 5,000 tribesmen had entered Kashmir and seized Muzaffarabad and Domel on 22 October. It warned that the force was about to attack Kohala. The Prime Minister added that he also had information about large-scale raids In the Jammu area, right up to Poonch. He pointed out that the trucks and arms which had been supplied to the raiders could have been provided only with the assistance of the Pakistan authorities. He had received Information that the Invasion had He had received Information that the Invasion had been planned a fortnight earlier at a conference In Rawalpindi.” [5]
Mr Jinnah’s handpicked Pakistan Army Chief of Staff ,Gracey , was India’s best intelligence asset in October 1947 .
In this regard Mr. Jinnah , unwittingly and without knowing what was happening , was masterly in selecting people who destroyed Pakistan Army’s chances of, any ,strategic success in Kashmir war as well as selecting two notorious bureaucrats, Malik Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhry Mohammad Ali ,who destroyed Pakistan’s political system and paved the way for Ayub Khan’s disastrous military takeover.
Later General Musa Khan in his memoirs narrated that the Indian plan to airlift troops to Srinagar was was routed through Lahore in Pakistan , as this was the only available line. Musa tasked Lieutenant Qaiser Baig to decode the Indian cyphers . Once this was done Musa contacted Chaudhry Mohammad Ali who happened to be in Lahore and was the chief civil servant actually running Pakistan. His staff forbade Musa from waking him up, as Chaudhry had gone to bed. Musa, a ranker with limited initiative, just went back. But he did send the Intercepted Indian plan to the Pakistan Army DMI/DMO , Brigadier Sher Khan, MC , who as per Musa’s account did not do anything.[6]
One of the two biggest Pakistani failures in addition to general Gracey sabotaging Pakistan Army’s Kashmir war effort at every strategic decision point was in cancelling the Pakistani plan to cut Indian lines of communication at Jammu , proposed by Brigadier Akbar Khan Pareechkhel DSO on 27thOctober 1947 at a conference presided by Pakistan’s indecisive prime minister at Lahore. As per Akbar Khan the idea was only supported by Mamdot and Qayyum Khan, while the majority participants had cold feet.[7]
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Brigadier Akbar Khan, D.S.O described this meeting of indecisives as below: —
“In Pakistan, the same evening, the Prime Minister held an
unofficial conference at Lahore to consider the situation arising out of Kashmir’s accession and India’s military intervention. At this conference, among others were also present Colonel Iskander Mirza (then Defence Secretary, later to be Governor- General), Chaudhry Mohammad Ali (then Secretary General, later to be Prime Minister), Abdul Qayum Khan, Chief Minister of the Frontier Province and Nawab Mamdot, Chief Minister of the Punjab. Brigadier Sher Khan and I, were also invited. At this conference I proposed that an attempt should be made to liquidate Jammu in order to block the only road along which India could send reinforcements into the valley and the rest of Kashmir. I did not suggest that troops should be used for this purpose or that the Government should get involved in this. I suggested only that tribesmen may be allowed to make the attempt. I thought that three lashkars of a thousand each should be used. The tribesmen were available and I offered to go with them. With Indian military intervention, Jammu had at once become a focal point of the greatest importance. India had no other land route going into the State except that passing through Jammu. All reinforcements, coming by land, would concentrate there. From there they would move north into the valley and thereby prolong operations in that area. From there also, they would move west along the road to Naushehra and thereby seriously threaten the liberation progress in the central areas of Rajauri and Poonch etc., where at present the liberation forces were virtually masters of the situation. Further, if relations between India and Pakistan took a dangerous turn, the base at Jammu, sitting right on top of Sialkot, would become a serious threat to our own security. Blocking Jammu, I felt, would be like nipping an evil in the bud, while leaving it open would be letting the Azad operations become like emptying, with a cup, a tank into which a running stream was pouring. Although there might be no prospect of the tribesmen capturing Jammu, their action might well scare the Maharajah enough to run away from there as he had run from Srinagar. In any case, with him or without, a large number of others would certainly run for the safety across the border and in doing so they would block the route for a while. Or at least, once in the hills to the west of Jammu, the tribesmen would for a time prevent the movement of troops towards the central areas. The proposal was however, with the exception of Abdul Qayum Khan and Nawab Mamdot, opposed by everyone else—and it had to be abandoned. It was felt that this would provoke India to attack Pakistan and such a risk could not be taken. No one of course wanted an Indo-Pakistan war but many reasons did exist in support of the feeling that India was in no position to start such a war. Already the tribesmen had penetrated 80 miles into the State, already they had gone through Pakistan territory, already India believed, though wrongly, that tribesmen had also besieged Mirpur, Poonch, Kotli, Jhangar, Naushehra and Bhimbar —and, therefore, India already had enough excuse for extending the war to Pakistan. That she had not done so was simply because of the fact that she was militarily not strong enough to take such a risk. Her army was undergoing reorganisation, she had enough worries inside the country, and she was particularly apprehensive about provoking the tribal flood into East Punjab where the population was in panic due to such exaggerated reports as those referring to Baramula where out of 14,000 non- Muslims only 3,000 were said to have survived.” [8]
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Even an Indian direct participant was surprised by this greatest Pakistani failure which can be squarely assigned to Pakistan’s highest civilian leadership: —
“The area between Pathankot and Jhangar, a distance of 140 miles, offered the raiders a very broad front for their depredations, with all their objectives within a radius of 15 to 20 miles from their sanctuaries. On our side, the fair-weather road from Pathankot to Jhangar running parallel to the border and vulnerable throughout its length, provided the only means of communications in this area. This unmetalled road went over. several fords and ferries across large rivers. It would go out of commission for days together when it rained and these parts have a fair amount of winter rains. The first ’70 miles of this road from Pathankot to Jammu was the life-line for all our troops in this theatre. It is a wonder why the enemy confined his activities between Pathankot and Jammu to merely cattle-lifting and women-abducting raids. Perhaps he was too preoccupied with the “pleasures” of pillage and plunder to worry about the “cold comfort” of gaining any tactical advantages.” [9]
The second greatest Pakistani Muslim League leadership failure was not agreeing to lieutenant colonel Tommy Massaud Khan’s proposal to attack Srinagar with a squadron of PAVO Cavalry’s armoured cars.
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A conference was held between 30th October and 4th November, where Kashmir’s fate was sealed by Pakistani political and military cowardice!
Brigadier Akbar Khan the military man in charge of the raider’s operations had returned to Pindi after a visit to the frontline at Srinagar. The tribesmen had not yet been repulsed and were planning infiltration operations with the aim of capturing Srinagar airfield. Akbar Khan’s analysis about the operational solution to the problem of tribesmen’s inability to attack well entrenched Indian infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery was to provide the tribesmen with armoured cars.
Major Massaud from 11 Cavalry stationed at Rawalpindi volunteered to take his own squadron’s armoured cars to Srinagar, on his own initiative, without informing any superior headquarter.
Akbar Khan stated in his book ‘Raiders in Kashmir’ that Major Masud said that the armoured cars would go without official permission, at his own risk and that the men would be in civilian clothes. [10]
This fact is proved by two independent authorities who were not from armored corps and thus had no ulterior motivation or desire to project 11 Cavalry.
One was General Akbar who was present at the conference and the other was Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry who was a gunner, and was also present at the same conference.[11]
Akbar states that as the conference was coming to an end Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan a Muslim League leader and Central Government Minister entered the room. Brigadier Sher Khan who was the Director Military Operations had also joined the discussion. This, Raja Ghazanfar (despite being from a so-called martial area) was horrified about the armoured cars proposal, and according to both Akbar Khan and Amjad Chaudhry opposed the idea.
He was supported by Brigadier Sher (Lion) Khan! Both the Minister and the Lion-Hearted brigadier feared that such a step would lead to an open war between Pakistan and India.
Amjad Chaudhry states that one of the participants at this conference a Muslim League minister Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan even voiced an apprehension that the unruly tribesmen may get unruly and damage the Maharajas palace at Srinagar ! [12]
Thus in the end Akbar Khan who was not directly in charge of the operations of tribesmen was overruled by a pacifist Minister more keen to enjoy ministerial perks and a paper tiger brigadier wearing the mask of the high-sounding appointment of Director Military Operations!
Major General Akbar Khan, the real hero of the 1947-48 War. A DSO of Burma and the architect of philosophy of armed insurrection by aiding non state actors as state proxies. His ideas of use of non-state actors as advanced in his writings were picked up much later and practiced in Afghanistan,NEFA and Kashmir
The only difference between India and Pakistan was not whether one side possessed armoured cars or not, but the simple fact that while Mr. Jinnah did not have any able Muslim deputy to advise him about military affairs (whether Punjabi, Hindustani or Pathan)
Brigadier Amjad Ali Chaudhry in his book wondered why Mr. Jinnah did not appoint a Pakistani commander in chief of Pakistan Army? [13]
Nehru was assisted by a much larger team of more resolute, more intellectually capable Hindu deputies like Patel who ensured that armoured cars of 7th Light Cavalry; under command Lieutenant N.G David; did reach Srinagar area on 7th November and inflicted on the poorly armed tribesmen equipped with bolt action rifles a defeat at what the Indians themselves call the decisive battle of Shalateng!
Supreme irresolution and phenomenal cowardice was the hallmark of Pakistan’s first cabinet, all handpicked by Mr. Jinnah , but till todate , so called historians of Pakistan are only blaming general Gracey.
[1] Page-215- THE NATION THAT LOST ITS SOUL-Op cit.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Page-184- THE PAKISTAN ARMY-1947-1949- Op cit.
[4] Page-215- THE NATION THAT LOST ITS SOUL-Op cit.
[5] Pages-43 and 44- WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN KASHMIR-1947-48- C Dasgupta -SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd -New Delhi and London- 2002.
[6] Page-80 and 81- JAWAN TO GENERAL- RECOLLECTIONS OF A PAKISTANI SOLDIER-General Mohammad Musa-Royal Book Company-Karachi-First Published in 1984- Reprinted in 2008.
[7] Pages-23 and 24- RAIDERS IN KASHMIR- Major General Akbar Khan ,DSO- First published by Pak Publishers in 1970- This edition reprinted by Printed by Arya Offset Press Daya Basti Delhi-110035 in 1995.
[8] Pages-23 and 24 -RAIDERS IN KASHMIR-Op cit.
[9] Pages-35 and 36- OPERATION RESCUE-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR-1947-49-Major General S.K Sinha- Vision Books- New Delhi-1977
[10] Page-23-RAIDERS IN KASHMIR-Op cit- Akbar Khan thus stated “On return to Pindi, I was immediately able to find Colonel Masud, who volunteered to take not two but a whole squadron of his unit armoured cars. His men, he said, would go in plain clothes without official permission and at their own risk. This was indeed a thrilling response to the needs of the occasion, and all seemed well. While they were getting ready I held a consultation with Brigadier Sher Khan, Lt. Colonel Arbab and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the last being a Central Government Minister at Pindi. Brigadier Sher Khan and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan stoutly opposed the idea. This, they thought, would certainly bring about war; the Government would never forgive it; in any case it, chances of success were very little, and I was to remember that the front was not under my command. So the proposal was abandoned. Thus armoured cars did not go to the assistance of the tribesmen and the tribesmen were not destined to find some other way of entering Srinagar.”
[11] Page-6 and 7– SEPTEMBER 65-BEFORE AND AFTER—Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Ferozesons Lahore-1977-Reprinted in September 2015.
[12] Interestingly this assertion made in 1977 original edition of the book was removed in the September 2015 edition.
