Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal is an Indian Army legend. A National Defense Academy (NDA) and Indian Military Academy (IMA) alum, Khetarpal was commissioned into Indian Army’s armoured regiment, Poona Horse and won India’s highest gallantry award the Paramvir Chakra, posthumously, for his heroism in the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Sriram Raghavan’s Ikkis is an autobiographical account of Arun’s life and the Battle of Basantar. A battle where Khetarpal’s Centurion tank took on the Pakistan army’s Patton tanks and fought valiantly before he succumbed to injuries on the battlefield. The movie stars Agastya Nanda, grandson of Amitabh Bachchan, as Arun Khetarpal with Dharmendra and Jaideep Ahlawat. The former plays the role of Brigadier Madan Lal Khetarpal, Arun’s father and the latter plays the role of Brigadier Nisar of the Pakistan army.
The movie recounts the visit of Brigadier Khetarpal, in 2001, to Lahore where he is hosted by Brigadier Nisar of the Pakistan Army. The senior Khetarpal is visiting Lahore for his college reunion and to visit Sargodha from where his family had to migrate in the aftermath of India’s partition in 1947. This story track runs in parallel to the story of Arun’s days at the NDA, IMA, days leading up to the battle and the battle itself. The senior Khetarpal, now in his eighties is all dewy eyed for his roots and the younger one, who has turned 21 (Ikkis is the word for the number 21 in Hindi) is eager and keen to prove his mantle on the battlefield. The retired Brigadier is serenaded by everyone, by his hosts, his former classmates and the family that now lives in his ancestral house. The young second lieutenant is learning the brutal nature of combat and the human cost of war as he rolls on towards Basantar. The dramatic arc of the movie ends with Brigadier Nisar telling the elder Khetarpal that he was the commanding officer of the Patton that shot the lieutenant’s tank and it was his assault that proved fatal.
I am a big Sriram Raghavan fan. His Johnny Gaddar makes it to every list of top 10 Hindi movies that I have ever made. Raghavan has the knack of writing stories and characters that are unconventional for commercial Hindi cinema, his plot twists don’t disappoint and nobody uses songs from Hindi movies of the 1950s, ’60s & ’70s like Raghavan. He eschews over the top dramatics and gets his actors to deliver pitch perfect performances.
Ikkis is handicapped by the fact that it is autobiographical. Raghavan has limited scope for crafting a story that surprises. This is his attempt at making a war movie and the stories of the two Khetarpals is a prop. He wants us to see that Indians and Pakistanis are the same people, there are no winners in a war, soldiers are common folk who pay with their lives for the idea of nationhood, there is common humanity that binds us all and the Pakistan army, just like the Indian army, is a professional force doing what is necessary. He uses all the tropes to make these points. Scenes of the elder Khetarpal with Brigadier Nisar’s family, his former classmates, the joyous outdoor dinner organized by the occupants of his ancestral home, the bullets ridden, lacerated bodies of soldiers and the depiction of Brigadier Nisar as an honorable gentleman who represents the best of Pakistan army. Continue reading Ikkis: Thoughts on another Propaganda Movie
Were You Colonised or Not? The UN Slavery Vote That Split the World
West vs the Rest
Today’s UNGA vote, 123 for, 3 against, 52 abstentions, is a clean ledger of where the world stands. The resolution declares the transatlantic slave trade “the gravest crime against humanity.” Three countries voted against: the United States, Israel, and Argentina. The UK and all 27 EU members abstained.
The 52 abstentions are the more revealing column. The EU’s stated objection was legal: calling this the “gravest” crime implies a hierarchy among atrocity crimes, which has no basis in international law. That’s a defensible position. It’s also a convenient one for countries that ran the trade.
The US was blunter; its representative objected to the “cynical usage of historical wrongs as a leverage point to reallocate modern resources.” At least that’s honest about what reparations actually means in practice.
The UN is essentially asking whether countries whether they were colonised or not?
The 123 is the story. This isn’t Russia and China championing the Global South; it’s Africa, the Caribbean, and most of Asia doing it themselves. This marks the first floor vote at the UN specifically on transatlantic slavery as a crime, and a call for reparations.
The resolution is non-binding, so nothing material changes today. But the vote is a data point: on a question of historical accountability, the West is either against or abstaining, and everyone else is not.
That’s the fault line. West vs the Rest; and the Rest has the numbers. Gaza, Russia, Iran: all proxies for the same fracture. Russia ran an empire, but its Soviet collapse was so total it no longer reads as imperial. China likewise. So both get to stand on the other side of the line.
And underneath the EU’s legal objection, the “hierarchy of crimes” argument, is something unspoken: the Holocaust has long held the position of singular atrocity in Western moral architecture. This resolution is, implicitly, a challenge to that. The Rest is saying: your crime towards us was graver, or at least as grave. Europe couldn’t vote yes without conceding the point.
Is Hormuz, Israel’s Suez but Pakistan’s Second Act?
Start with the uncomfortable question nobody in Washington wants to ask directly: how is this not a defeat for Israel?
Trump reposted Shehbaz Sharif’s offer to host US-Iran peace talks, and Bannon’s WarRoom picked it up within the hour. That’s the tell. When Pakistan’s diplomatic positioning lands on the most watched MAGA platform in America, amplified by the President himself, the “Second Act” isn’t a thesis anymore. It’s the news.
In 1956, Britain and France attacked Egypt alongside Israel. Militarily, they won. The Egyptian army collapsed. The canal was taken. Then Washington intervened, sterling cracked, and within weeks they withdrew — humiliated, permanently diminished, never again operating as independent great powers in the Middle East. They won the battle and lost the century. (As an aside, PM Modi made his allegiances clear from the very start of this conflict; the bombing was reportedly postponed for his visit to Washington. India, like Britain and France in 1956, has picked its side. The question is whether it has picked the winning one.)
That is the template. Now run the present war through it. Israel spent two years engineering this confrontation. Then, at the exact moment diplomacy began to work, the bombs fell. Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, a cautious, establishment figure from a cautious, establishment country, said it plainly: nuclear negotiations were making progress, Iran had agreed to no enriched uranium stockpiling and full IAEA verification, peace was within reach. Talks were due to resume on 2 March.
The strikes began on 28 February.
That is not coincidence. That is a choice: war over settlement. Now look at the structure that follows. Iran has not won militarily. Its air force is degraded. Its infrastructure is hit. Its Supreme Leader is dead, replaced by his son; a harder man, not a softer one, which is itself a signal about how decapitation strategies tend to end. But Iran has achieved the one thing that matters strategically: leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Analysts are already describing any exit that leaves Iran as the effective gatekeeper of the Strait as a colossal strategic failure for the United States. That is the centre of gravity. The US can bomb, seize assets, escalate. But it cannot reopen the Strait on its own terms if Iran is willing to absorb damage and impose cost. Geography is doing the work. Patience is doing the rest.
Now watch Washington move.
A $200 billion supplemental request is already in play. Oil prices are moving. Trump has begun the political separation, “I might have forced their hand”, while his own Secretary of State had already said Israel led the way. That asymmetry matters. Trump wants a deal he can sell to American families at the petrol pump. Israel wants Iran broken. Those are incompatible war aims, and they are visibly diverging: Trump rebuked Israel over the South Pars gasfield strike; Israel assassinated Ali Larijani, seen by some as a key potential negotiating figure, just as back-channel possibilities were opening.
The same negotiations torpedoed in February are now the only viable exit. Trump says Iran wants a deal. Iran denies it. Neither side is behaving like a defeated power. This is not surrender. This is endurance; and endurance, historically, beats air supremacy.
That is Suez. It does not require retreat under fire. It requires something subtler: the moment when the patron begins calculating its costs independently from the client, and reaches a different conclusion. When that happens, the war ends regardless of battlefield position. Britain and France didn’t lose in 1956 because they ran out of soldiers. They lost because Washington ran out of patience.
The American public will eventually ask whose war this was. That question is already forming. And it is precisely here, in the gap opened by Washington’s growing ambivalence and Israel’s strategic overreach, that the second story begins.
While the US and Israel have been consumed by a war that is proving harder to exit than to enter, one country has quietly stepped into the resulting vacuum. Not China. Not Russia. Not Turkey, though Ankara is watching closely.
Pakistan.
Continue reading Is Hormuz, Israel’s Suez but Pakistan’s Second Act?
Why is Pakistan suddenly central to US-Iran diplomacy?
Note: As always, I do not tolerate anti-Pakistan comments on my threads. If you don’t respect the red lines, your comments will be summarily deleted. The usual suspects (they know who they are) have been completely banned from commenting on my posts. Don’t antagonize me.
By Anwar Iqbal in DAWN:
According to these reports, Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership has been in direct contact with senior US officials, including President Donald Trump, conveying Islamabad’s willingness to facilitate dialogue and reduce tensions.
Some accounts suggest that Pakistan has even indicated readiness to host talks in Islamabad if the parties are prepared to explore diplomatic channels.
Vali Nasr, a prominent Washington-based scholar, argues that any Pakistani diplomatic initiative is unlikely to occur in isolation from Saudi Arabia:
“Pakistan will only step up if it has Saudi backing — and prodding. Riyadh is likely very much in the picture,” he wrote in a post on X.
And:
Pakistan’s value as a potential intermediary also stems from its parallel access to Tehran and Washington — a rare combination in the current geopolitical climate.
Analyst Michael Kugelman makes this point clearly: “Pakistan is far from being an unlikely US-Iran mediator. Many high-level Pak-Iran meetings over last year. The US administration is very fond of Pakistan. Trump has said (Field Marshal Asim) Munir knows Iran better than most. Also worth noting that Pakistan represents Iran’s diplomatic interests in the US.”
Update: Pakistan stands ‘ready, honored’ to host US-Iran talks, says PM Shehbaz
“What did Op Sindoor actually accomplish”?
23rd March 2003. Twenty three years ago today, a Pakistani Operative Zia Mustafa of the Laskhar-e-Toiba walks into the village of Nadimarg, Jammu and Kashmir. Wearing fake uniforms, Zia and his accomplices wake up the the village, and then proceed to murder 11 men, 11 women and a boy after lining them up. Walking away, the terrorists hear a baby crying, and order to silence him. The baby becomes murder victim #24. Link
23 March 2026, I read a comment on a BP thread discussing the West Asia war and Iran’s defiance, and the question that is the the topic of this post is asked.
I feel obligated to answer it. The statistics of so-called ‘non-state actor’ victims inflicted by Pakistani groups on Indian soil, since the 1990s, into the 2000s and beyond are stark. For an Indian who has grown up to adulthood in these years, actually lived through multiple decades where hundreds if not thousands of Indians dying as a result of the Lashkars and Jaish of the world was just part and parcel of life – all given succor by the Pakistani military and state. The datasheet linked here shows the tragedy that has been slowly but surely being deterred – and this is only starting with the year 2000. According to SATP, more than 25000 deaths occurred in J&K between 1988 and 2000.
The change in the public response of the Indian government, starting with the surgical strikes in 2016, and then escalated with the Balakot Bombing raids, and the direct and sharp decrease in the number of terrorism incidents is unmistakable. Operation Sindoor, the 4 day skirmish that took place in May 2025 on the heels of unarmed tourists being murdered in cold blood – is the exclamation mark in a simple statement that demonstrates Indian resilience and response when challenged with terrorism. No more will such attacks go unanswered. And the ultimate sponsors of such evil – the Pakistan Military itself – will have to bear direct consequences delivered. Via Brahmos-Mail.
Nobody needs a degree in statistics, to spot the co-relation in the timeline – India starts executing public retaliation in the aftermath of terror attacks, the frequency of such attacks drops sharply.
As far as the spreadsheets accounting and the nuts and bolts of what targets were hit during Op Sindoor that would count as “actual accomplishments” – there is ample evidence available for any objective observer to get themselves informed. From satellite imagery of multiple PAF bases and runways ‘double-tapped’ into shutting down for months, to ‘hardened’ aircraft shelters being demolished and rebuilt months after the fact.
But what Op Sindoor accomplished goes beyond merely a largely one-sided ledger of inflicting losses to military bases and flagship bases of terrorist organizations – Op Sindoor was a demonstration of commitment by the Indian state – a resolve that no longer will the nuclear umbrella allow the Pakistani Military to continue waging its ‘jihad of a thousand cuts’ without the consequences of a military conflict. One that will inflict costs not just on the bankrupt Pakistani state, with FATF gray lists hurting its citizens. Send terrorists to murder Indians, and bombs will drop on Pakistani Military bases in response. Op Sindoor is a promise of resolve. The Indian government will respond militarily if you threaten the security of its citizens.
Post-script: Apart from making an unambiguous demonstration of Indian deterrence when facing up against terrorism emanating from Pakistan, arguably the greatest indicator of the success of Op Sindoor, is the Pakistani Military’s attempt at copy-pasting their own version on Pakistan’s Eastern Border. Unfortunately, the results for the second sibling that was birthed from ‘Cracking India’ in 1947, have been a lot more….mixed.
The Façade of a rules‑based international order
Politics is deeply ideological—but does ideology really matter in geopolitics at all?
A few modern (if that’s a fair word) Islamic countries—Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan—have adopted an increasingly anti‑India position. For Pakistan, this stance is ideological; for Turkey and Azerbaijan, it is clearly pragmatic. Meanwhile, India has become friendlier with the Taliban, Iran (the current war notwithstanding), and the Gulf states.
Similarly, India’s closeness to Israel is not ideological—though cheerleaders on social media often present it that way. It is strategic and does not depend on Jews being tolerant of Hinduism. I have zero insight into how Israelis view Hinduism (nor do I, as a resident of India who never intends to visit Israel, particularly care). But that should not matter, because Israel is one of the very few all‑weather geopolitical partners India has.
India needs weapons and technology, and it gets them from Israel—so Israel is important to India. India needs oil and gets it from Iran and Russia—so they are important to India.
These statements may sound childish or crude, but they capture how geopolitics actually works. It does not run on ideology or cultural history. Much of the cultural narrative that intellectuals and pop‑culture try to weave around geopolitics is post‑hoc justification meant for an idealistic public. Even dictatorships engage in such storytelling—not just democracies. There are exceptions, of course. For instance, when the Nupur Sharma controversy broke, it triggered a small geopolitical crisis for India.
Nation‑states are both products of culture and creators of culture. Cultural and political anxieties were the prime movers of the Pakistan movement. But the lived realities of Pakistan, India, and even Bangladesh as nation‑states have produced their own cultural trajectories and divergences.
So should an Indian cheer for the bombing of a friendly totalitarian theocracy at the hands of its friend which is a selective liberal democracy {only for the chosen people) ?
No—not only because Iran is a friend of India, but because emerging economies that are democracies need at least the façade of a rules‑based international order to function. Donald Trump doesn’t seem to like the façade but diplomacy of varying shades still ought to be relevant in politics for years to come.
The Hormuz Ultimatum: Wealth Doesn’t Win Wars
Wealth Doesn’t Win Wars
A contact in New York mentioned, almost in passing, that the shelves at their local (premium) supermarket were beginning to empty. Not bare, but noticeably thin, the way they go before a blizzard. People panic-buying quietly, without announcement. At LaGuardia, long queues that the local press has barely covered. The official newsflow says nothing. But the supermarket shelves don’t lie.
This is how the consequences of a war 6,000 miles away arrive in the richest city in the world; not with sirens, but with gaps on the grocery shelves and unexplained airport delays that nobody in authority seems in a hurry to explain. The information lag is itself a story. There is roughly a week between what is happening and what is being reported. Don’t believe one’s lying eyes.
BB’s thesis is that military power is ultimately a function of GDP. It is a reasonable working assumption. It is also, we would argue, dangerously wrong in the specific conditions we are now watching play out in real time.
The United States and Israel are the two wealthiest, most technologically sophisticated military powers to have ever jointly prosecuted a war. Their adversary is a sanctioned, inflation-wracked theocracy that has been massacring its own citizens and losing proxy after proxy for two years. And yet here we are, Day 23 of Operation Epic Fury, with Trump issuing a 48-hour ultimatum to obliterate Iran’s power plants unless the Strait of Hormuz is fully reopened, Iran responding that any such strike will be met with attacks on U.S. and Israeli energy and infrastructure assets, Brent crude at $112 a barrel and Goldman Sachs projecting elevated prices through 2027, and the administration having exhausted every economic lever it possesses. The richer side is losing the economic war. The question is whether they know it yet.
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Sociology of Surrender
The pattern is not new. We have watched it twice in living memory, in the same geography, and both times the lesson was the same. Continue reading The Hormuz Ultimatum: Wealth Doesn’t Win Wars
Indian RW cheering for Iran
I am adding this post after procrastinating putting it up for days.
Most Indian RWers and even Centrists and LWers are directly or subtly on side of Iran vs Israel/US. One just has to visit timeline of Hindutvavadi influencers like JSai Deepak, Abhijit Iyer, Kushal Mehra.
Even the Right leaning or Centrist media people like Shiv Aroor, Palki Sharma, Arnab are actively cheerleading Iran. Indian government has thus far avoided taking a position pro Iran, but its obvious where Indian interests lie.
Despite Military ties with Israel and India seen as generally pro Israel – the criticism of Israel and Bibi is very common now in Indian SM.
Funny none of the posters here have noticed this !
Dhurandhar The Revenge – The Wrath of Bharat
Writing this review now as I came home at 5 am and slept the whole day.
Will keep it spoiler-free as much as possible.
First of all, if some people had issues with the politics of the first movie, they are going to hate this one as it takes it way way beyond, shifting the overton window so far to the right.
The movie is great, super fun and keeps you engaged throughout. It is a bit looser than the first one, not having the razor sharp focus of the espionage drama that it was, instead transforming into more of an action movie.
The action setpieces are way more brutal and better choreographed and more in number compared to the first one.
The movie starts with one of the setpieces barely a few minutes in and then keeps going for a while before slowing down a bit leading to the interval (which is the best part of the movie) before building up steam and not letting go till the end.
Music, as always is a banger with a variety of remixes of old songs and some interesting needledrops.
Already on it’s way to be the highest grossing Indian movie of all time with massive crowds even in South India.
Anyways, highly highly recommended.
Ya naya Hindustan ka naya cinema hai.
Sexual Pleasure as Thought: Erotics in Pre-modern South Asia
As a change from war and geopolitics, I came across this presentation by Shubham Arora, a PhD candidate at the University of British Columbia and a Harold Coward India Research Fellow at the University of Victoria.
In this talk, Shubham Arora introduces a long and often misunderstood intellectual tradition from South Asia devoted to thinking about pleasure. Beginning with the world-renowned Kāmasūtra and continuing into the modern period, this tradition did far more than describe sexual practices. It treated pleasure as a subject worthy of reflection, analysis, and debate. Like other fields of knowledge in premodern South Asia—such as law, medicine, or aesthetics—these works developed ways of classifying desire, discussing relationships, and reflecting on how pleasure fits into a well-lived life. The authors of these texts were asking questions about intimacy, emotion, social roles, and human fulfillment. Yet in modern times, these texts, especially the Kāmasūtra, have often been reduced to exotic curiosities. Shaped by colonial fantasies and later commercial reinventions, they have been marketed globally as manuals of sexual practices, while at the same time facing censorship and controversy within South Asia itself. By revisiting these works in their historical context, this talk offers an as-yet unexplored perspective: understanding erotics as a thoughtful and evolving tradition concerned with how principles, possibilities, and practices of pleasure changed.